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Article 
Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements: 
Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) 
LIESA L. RICHTER 
The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence was hard at 
work in 2013 trying to bring resolution to a mystery that has plagued Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) since its enactment thirty-eight years ago.  Scholars, judges, 
and litigants have long pondered why the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
carved out a hearsay exemption for prior consistent statements admitted to 
repair impeaching attacks on witness motivations, but failed to extend the 
same treatment to other similarly situated prior consistencies admitted to 
repair other types of impeaching attacks.  In May 2013, the Advisory 
Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in an effort to 
end the mysterious disparate treatment of prior consistent witness 
statements by expanding the hearsay exemption to include prior consistent 
statements ignored by the original Rule.  Although the proposed 
amendment is on track to take effect December 1, 2014, it has encountered 
strong criticism regarding its potential to liberally admit witness hearsay.  
This Article seeks to find a constructive path forward by highlighting the 
beneficial purposes of the proposed amendment and exploring criticisms 
levied against it.  The Article concludes that an amendment of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) is in keeping with the policies underlying the original Rule 
and with the broader operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  After 
examining several drafting alternatives for an amended Rule 801(d)(1)(B), 
however, the Article concludes that a simple and straightforward 
amendment that applies a single standard to substantive availability of all 
prior consistent statements would be superior to the proposed amendment 
because it would eliminate the confusion that has plagued the existing Rule 
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Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements:  
Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) 
LIESA L. RICHTER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Attacking a witness’s testimony represents a standard and time-
honored trial technique.  Indeed, there are numerous ways in which a 
witness may be discredited on the stand.1  Following such an impeaching 
attack, the proponent of the witness may wish to rehabilitate the witness in 
the eyes of the fact-finder.2  When a trial witness’s motivations, memory, 
or consistency are challenged during cross-examination, pre-trial “prior 
consistent statements” of the witness may serve a powerful rehabilitative 
purpose.3  At common law, such prior consistent statements were not to be 
considered for their truth by the fact-finder due to the prohibition on 
hearsay evidence, but were useful to demonstrate the constancy of the 
witness’s story.4  In other words, the evidence for the jury to consider had 
to emanate from the trial testimony of the witness and the prior statements 
could be used only to assess the witness’s credibility on the stand. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence altered the common law treatment of 
some prior consistent statements through Rule 801(d)(1)(B) by allowing 
them to be considered for their truth, as well as for their rehabilitative 
purpose, when “offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the 
declarant recently fabricated [testimony] or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying.”5  Although this change affected the 
use of prior consistent statements after an impeaching attack on the 
witness’s motivations, it curiously did not alter the common law with 
                                                                                                                          
* Thomas P. Hester Presidential Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law.  I would like 
to thank Professor Ed Imwinkelried, Professor Katheleen Guzman, and Professor Murray Tabb for 
many helpful comments on a prior draft of this Article. 
1 See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33, at 205 (7th ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter MCCORMICK] (“[T]he common law and the Federal Rules liberally admit impeaching 
evidence.”). 
2 See id. § 47, at 303 (noting that the “witness’s proponent must be given an opportunity to . . . 
present[] evidence rehabilitating the [impeached] witness”). 
3 See id. § 47, at 307 (noting use of prior consistent statements as one of two principal methods of 
rehabilitation). 
4 See id. § 47, at 318 (noting that even a witness statement constitutes hearsay if offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted, and limiting non-hearsay use of prior consistent statements to rehabilitating 
the credibility of a witness). 
5 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). 
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respect to prior consistencies offered to repair other forms of impeachment, 
such as attacks on memory or constancy.6  Thus, in the post-Rules 
universe, there is disparate treatment of prior consistent statements used to 
rehabilitate: some may be considered for their truth by the fact-finder, 
while others may be used only to repair and must be accompanied by 
limiting instructions cautioning the jury against substantive use.7 
In the years since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, this 
hearsay exemption for certain prior consistent statements has become 
complicated and confused.  The difficulty began with the original drafters’ 
decision to permit substantive use of prior consistent statements after only 
one form of impeachment, with no explanation as to why other prior 
consistencies relevant to repair other forms of impeachment should not 
also be available for substantive use.8  This difficulty was compounded 
twenty years later by the Supreme Court’s effort in Tome v. United States9 
to make sense of the drafters’ choice to single out one form of 
rehabilitation by finding a “premotive” requirement embedded in Rule 
801(d)(1)(B).10  
As a result of this history, there are several different types of prior 
consistent statements that may be treated very differently in federal court 
today.11  Following a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive or 
influence, a “premotive” prior consistent statement by the witness may be 
admitted to rehabilitate and for its truth.12  In contrast, prior consistent 
statements made by the witness after the inception of the improper motive 
may never be used for their truth.13  Federal courts differ as to whether 
such “postmotive” prior consistent statements should be excluded 
altogether or whether they may be admitted solely for their non-hearsay 
                                                                                                                          
6 See id. (allowing prior statements to be considered for their truth only after an attack on 
“influence or motive”). 
7 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 7012, at 151–52 
(2011 interim ed.) (noting that certain “prior consistent statements are admitted for corroborative 
purposes only and not as substantive evidence; the jury should be instructed accordingly”). 
8 See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note (discussing reasons for allowing substantive 
use of prior consistent statements after an impeaching attack on the witness’s motives, without 
commentary as to why prior consistent statements cannot be used substantively after other forms of 
impeachment). 
9 513 U.S. 150 (1995). 
10 Id. at 160–62.  
11 Most states follow the standards adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence, extending confusion 
into state practice as well.  See ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 10 (2d ed. 2004) (noting generally that most state 
codifications of evidence law are similar “in organization and substance to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence”).  
12 Tome, 513 U.S. at 160. 
13 Id. at 156. 
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rehabilitative purpose.14  Finally, prior consistent statements that properly 
repair impeaching attacks on witness memory or consistency may never be 
admitted for their truth.15  They may, however, be provided to the fact-
finder for rehabilitative purposes with limiting instructions cautioning 
against substantive use.16 
To remedy the confusion surrounding Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and to bring 
consistency to treatment of prior consistent statements in federal court, the 
Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence has proposed an 
amendment to the Rule.17  The Committee considered various drafting 
alternatives for an amended Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and solicited public 
comment on the proposal, as well as input from federal district court 
judges.18  Following this process, the Advisory Committee and the 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure recently approved 
a proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).19  The proposed amendment 
adopts a two category approach to the substantive use of prior consistent 
statements, which maintains the current standard for prior consistencies 
offered to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive.20  It adds a hearsay exemption to the existing standard for prior 
consistent statements offered to rehabilitate a trial witness impeached on 
                                                                                                                          
14 Compare United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1273 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A] prior consistent 
statement offered for rehabilitation is either admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or it is not admissible 
at all.”), with United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 920 (4th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that “the pre-motive 
rule of Tome ha[s] no effect” where prior consistent statements are not offered as substantive evidence 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).   
15 See supra note 6. 
16 See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 149, 152 (“A prior consistent statement of the witness 
may be admitted without reference to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) when relevant to rehabilitation . . . . for 
corroborative purposes only and not as substantive evidence; the jury should be instructed 
accordingly.”). 
17 Memorandum from Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence 
Rules to Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (May 7, 2013) [hereinafter May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report], 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV05-2013.pdf. 
18 Id. at 1–4; see also TIM REAGAN & MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, SURVEY OF DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGES ON A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(D)(1)(B) CONCERNING 
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS app. (2012) [hereinafter FJC SURVEY], available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule801d1b.pdf/$file/rule801d1b.pdf (providing the email 
distributed to all district court judges asking for comments about the possibility of amending Rule 
801(d)(1)(B)). 
19 See May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 1 (seeking “final Standing 
Committee approval and transmittal to the Judicial Conference of the United States . . . of an 
amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B)”); see also REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE 
RULES 15 (2013), reprinted in COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AGENDA BOOK 33 (2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/R
ulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2014-01.pdf (noting that the Standing Committee 
approved the amendment by a voice vote). 
20 May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 3.  
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other grounds.21  The proposed amendment will be reviewed by the 
Judicial Conference and passed to the Supreme Court for consideration.22  
Pending these additional steps, the amendment is on track to take effect on 
December 1, 2014.23   
If adopted, the amendment would expand the hearsay exemption 
currently available for prior consistent statements to include prior 
consistent statements offered to repair other types of impeaching attacks on 
a witness.24  The goal of the proposed amendment is to eliminate the 
disparate treatment of similarly situated prior consistent statements at trial, 
as well as the need for confusing limiting instructions that may befuddle a 
lay jury.25  Yet the proposed amendment has received mixed reviews. 
Though some commentators generally support the expansion of the 
hearsay exemption, others have sharply criticized any effort to broaden the 
admissibility of prior witness statements.26  Still others, while supportive of 
a change, have criticized the specific drafting choices inherent in the 
proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).27 
This Article explores the policies underlying the proposed amendment, 
as well as criticisms levied against it.  The Article contends that an 
amendment that brings consistency to treatment of prior consistent 
statements is in keeping with the policies behind original Rule 
801(d)(1)(B).  Further, this Article argues that rational evidence rules that 
treat similarly situated evidence in a symmetrical fashion ultimately further 
the goals of efficiency and fairness that underscore the Federal Rules.  The 
Article also gives in-depth consideration to criticisms of the proposal, 
however, highlighting potential unintended consequences of the proposed 
amendment.  In response to these concerns, the Article explores drafting 
alternatives for an amended Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and suggests revisions that 
have the potential to curb the dangers suggested by its critics, while 
maintaining its beneficial purpose.  The Article ultimately proposes a 
                                                                                                                          
21 See id. at 3 (adding “to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on 
another ground” to the existing rule). 
22 See Pending Rules Amendments, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/p
ending-rules.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (outlining the steps taken following approval by the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure). 
23 ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, AGENDA BOOK 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2013-10.pdf 
(“Barring any unforeseen developments, these amendments will become effective on December 1, 
2014.”). 
24 May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 2. 
25 Id.; see also David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 407, 449 n.163 (2013) (examining limiting and other evidentiary instructions and their effect on a 
lay jury). 
26 See infra Part III.B. 
27 See May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 2 (noting “largely negative” but 
“sparse” public comment on the proposed amendment). 
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simple and straightforward amendment that discards the language of the 
existing rule in favor of a single standard allowing substantive use of all 
rehabilitative prior consistent statements.  A single standard amendment is 
best suited to eliminate the confusion that has plagued Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
and to chart a clear course for prior consistent statements in the future. 
Part II of this Article examines the common law history of prior 
consistent statements, as well as the treatment of prior consistencies under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Part II describes Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of it in Tome v. United 
States, and the ramifications of that decision for federal trial practice.  Part 
III describes the proposed amendment that would expand existing Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) and the policies supporting it.  Part III also articulates and 
examines the criticisms and concerns that have arisen in response to the 
current proposal.  Part IV seeks a path forward for Rule 801(d)(1)(B) that 
achieves the rational and consistent treatment of similarly situated prior 
consistent statements, and also accounts for the risk of indiscriminate 
admission of witness hearsay feared by critics.  In so doing, Part IV 
analyzes four alternatives to the existing proposal, identifying the potential 
benefits and drawbacks inherent in each.  Part IV ultimately suggests a 
concise amendment to expand Rule 801(d)(1)(B) that promises to 
harmonize treatment of all similarly situated prior consistencies.  This 
proposed revision of the amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would focus trial 
judges and litigants on the fundamental rehabilitative purpose of prior 
consistent statements and on the appropriate contextual analysis that serves 
as a gateway to expanded substantive use of prior consistent statements. 
II.  THE INCONSISTENT HISTORY OF PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
A.  The Common Law Approach to Impeachment and Rehabilitation  
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, 
evidentiary decisions were regulated by the common law.28  At common 
law, attorneys routinely used various impeachment techniques to 
undermine the credibility of testifying witnesses.29  Following an 
impeaching attack on a witness, the proponent of the witness often 
responded with rehabilitative information designed to repair any damage to 
the witness’s credibility.30  There were two overriding principles governing 
rehabilitation at common law that remain constant today.  First, a witness 
may not be rehabilitated unless an opponent previously launched some 
                                                                                                                          
28 See PARK ET AL., supra note 11, at 9–10 (noting that the “common law of evidence evolved 
over the centuries” that preceded the enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975).  
29 MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 33, at 205. 
30 See id. § 47, at 303 (describing rehabilitation). 
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impeaching attack on that witness.31  In other words, “bolstering” the 
credibility of a testifying witness whose credibility has yet to be contested 
is prohibited.32  Second, any rehabilitation of a witness must repair 
credibility at the point of attack.33  An impeaching attack on a witness’s 
ability to recall, for example, should not be repaired with a showing of the 
witness’s honesty.  Likewise, a showing of honesty does not counter the 
damage done to the witness’s faulty memory.  The trial judge, in his or her 
discretion—aided by the arguments of vigilant counsel—must police these 
two overriding principles on a contextual basis.  The trial judge must 
determine whether an impeaching attack occurred, what type of attack 
occurred, and whether the proffered rehabilitation is appropriately 
responsive.34 
At common law, prior out-of-court statements made by an impeached 
witness that were consistent with trial testimony were considered helpful in 
repairing credibility in certain circumstances.  More specifically, courts 
recognized that prior consistent statements could repair the credibility of a 
trial witness whose motivations had been questioned, whose memory had 
been challenged, or whose consistency in describing pertinent events had 
been attacked. 
A common type of impeachment that historically has opened the door 
to use a prior consistent statement is the attack on a witness’s motivations 
for testifying at trial.  For example, if a opposing counsel suggested on 
cross-examination that a witness’s trial testimony was recently developed 
as a result of some improper influence or other motivation, such as a bribe, 
pre-trial statements by the witness that are consistent with the trial version 
may serve to mitigate such an attack.  Specifically, prior consistent 
statements would powerfully rebut the suggestion that trial testimony was 
the product of a bribe if those statements were made prior to the alleged 
bribe.35  In these circumstances, courts typically permitted rehabilitation 
with prior consistent statements before the enactment of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.36   
                                                                                                                          
31 Id. § 47, at 303–04. 
32 See id. (“[O]ne general principle, recognized under both case law and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, is that absent an attack upon credibility, no bolstering evidence is allowed.”). 
33 See id. § 47, at 307 (“The rehabilitating facts must meet the impeachment with relative 
directness.”).    
34 See id. § 47, at 308 (noting that the trial judge has discretion to determine whether 
circumstances justify rehabilitative evidence). 
35 See 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 801-32 to -33 
(8th ed. 2002) (“[O]nce the suggestion is made that trial testimony is fabricated or that the witness has 
been unduly influenced, consistent statements made prior to the time when there was a motive for the 
witness to lie or the influence was likely are especially probative . . . .”). 
36 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“Prior consistent statements 
traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive but not as substantive evidence.”).   
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In addition, prior consistent statements historically were permitted to 
rehabilitate some trial witnesses whose memory had been challenged on 
cross-examination.37  For example, if an opponent suggested that a witness 
had forgotten important details about an underlying event as a result of the 
passage of time between that event and trial, that witness’s prior consistent 
statement made close in time to the foundational event could serve as 
powerful rebuttal.38  On the other hand, a prior consistent statement made 
by the witness shortly before trial and long after underlying events might 
not answer the charge of forgetfulness and might not be useful to 
rehabilitate. 
Finally, in some limited circumstances, courts at common law 
recognized that a witness’s prior consistent statement could repair an attack 
launched on that witness’s credibility by virtue of a prior inconsistent 
statement.39  For example, a prior consistent statement made by the witness 
at the same time as the alleged inconsistency might clarify or complete the 
witness’s prior statement that the opponent sought to characterize as 
inconsistent.  In this circumstance, a prior consistency might demonstrate 
that the statement offered as impeachment evidence was not really 
inconsistent with trial testimony at all.  Even a prior statement made by a 
trial witness at another time may account for or explain a purported 
inconsistency in a way that refutes the impeaching attack.40  As noted 
above, the important question in this arena relates to the second principle 
of rehabilitation—whether the proposed repair genuinely answers the 
impeaching attack.41  Evaluation of the impeachment launched, as well as 
the context of the prior consistency, has been critical in determining 
whether a prior consistent statement genuinely responds to the use of a 
                                                                                                                          
37 MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 49, at 120; see also Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New 
Proposal, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 257–58 (“Before the enactment of the Federal rules of Evidence, 
many commentaries and a few courts suggested that if a witness’ live testimony [was] challenged as the 
product of an inaccurate memory or a faulty recollection, a prior consistent statement [could] 
legitimately be offered to rebut the attack.” (footnotes omitted)). 
38 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-33 (“[I]f the witness is charged with a bad 
memory, a statement by the witness made near to the event and consistent with the in-court testimony 
tends to rebut the charge.”). 
39 See id. at 801-37 (noting that a prior consistent statement may be admissible “to explain or 
clarify an inconsistent statement introduced by the adversary”).   
40 See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 316 (“[W]hen the attacked witness denies making the 
inconsistent statement, evidence of consistent statements very near the time of the alleged inconsistent 
one is relevant to corroborate his denial.”); see also United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 
1986) (“When the prior statement tends to cast doubt on whether the prior inconsistent statement was 
made or on whether the impeaching statement is really inconsistent with the trial testimony, its use for 
rehabilitation purposes is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.  Such use is also permissible 
when the consistent statement will amplify or clarify the allegedly inconsistent statement.”). 
41 See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 315–16 (noting that some inconsistencies “remain[] 
despite all consistent statements”).   
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prior inconsistent statement and is thus admissible for rehabilitation. 
At common law, these basic principles of impeachment and 
rehabilitation, applied by the trial judge on a case-by-case basis, governed 
the admissibility of prior consistent statements.  Of course, out-of-court 
statements offered at trial for their truth constituted inadmissible hearsay at 
common law.42  Therefore, the prior consistent statements of trial witnesses 
would be considered hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the 
information conveyed therein.  To serve their rehabilitative purposes 
described above, however, such statements need not be considered 
substantively.  The simple fact that the witness previously uttered a 
statement that matches trial testimony might serve to repair an attack on 
memory, constancy, or improper motivation at the time of trial.  At 
common law, therefore, such rehabilitative prior consistent statements 
were admissible if they satisfied principles of rehabilitation, but solely for 
their non-hearsay credibility purposes.43  Prior consistencies could not be 
considered for their truth and thus could not assist in building a case. 
B.  Impeachment and Rehabilitation Under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975 to regulate the 
admissibility of evidence in federal trials.44  Although the drafters of the 
Rules created the most successful set of rules to govern the admissibility of 
evidence at trial, they did not seek to exhaustively dictate the admissibility 
of every piece of evidence that might be offered at trial.  In certain areas, 
therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not articulate a specific 
standard for evaluating certain types of evidence and leave decisions about 
the admissibility of evidence to be governed by common law development 
within the federal framework.45 
In keeping with this drafting philosophy, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not comprehensively regulate modes of impeachment and 
rehabilitation of trial witnesses.46  In regulating impeachment practices, the 
Federal Rules carefully control character evidence demonstrating a 
                                                                                                                          
42 See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 149 n.2 (noting that prior consistencies offered for their 
truth were excluded under common law). 
43 Ohlbaum, supra note 37, at 236. 
44 Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 
Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (2012)). 
45 See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 
908, 915 (1978) (“In principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. . . . In 
reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the somewhat 
altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated powers.”).  
46 MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 33, at 206 (noting that some impeaching attacks are not 
“specifically or completely treated by the Federal . . . Rules of Evidence, but nevertheless they are 
implicitly authorized by those rules”).  
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witness’s propensity for dishonesty.47  In addition, the Rules provide some 
limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent 
statements.48  The Rules also proscribe certain prejudicial forms of 
impeachment.49  While covering these areas of impeachment, the Federal 
Rules leave other well-accepted types of impeachment unregulated within 
Article Six of the Rules governing “Witnesses.”  Impeachment of a witness 
based on bias, sensory or mental incapacity, or contradiction are not treated 
specifically in the Federal Rules.50  Similarly, drafters of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence chose not to comprehensively regulate the methods of 
rehabilitating impeached trial witnesses.51  While Rule 608(a) governs the 
use of character witnesses to demonstrate the trustworthiness of testifying 
witnesses for rehabilitative purposes,52 there are no other provisions 
outlining proper methods for rehabilitating an impeached trial witness. 
Although there may not be specific rules governing well-accepted 
areas of impeachment and rehabilitation,53 this type of evidence remains 
regulated by Rules 401, 402, and 403, which require that all evidence 
admitted be relevant and provide for the exclusion of relevant evidence 
when its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers of unfair 
prejudice or other risks to the trial process.54  These Article Four 
provisions, therefore, maintain the common law limits on rehabilitation: 
rehabilitative evidence must be offered after impeachment and must serve 
                                                                                                                          
47 See FED. R. EVID. 608 & 609 (outlining the types of evidence that may be introduced to attack 
the character of a witness). 
48 See id. 613 (“Extrinsic evidence . . . is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an 
opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate 
the witness thereon.”). 
49 See, e.g., id. 610 (discussing the inadmissibility of evidence relating to beliefs or opinions on 
the matter of religion). 
50 See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 6094, at 627 (2d ed. 2007) (“No rules specifically address these . . . three ways to attack witness 
credibility.”); see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984) (“[T]he Rules do not by their 
terms deal with impeachment for ‘bias,’ although they do expressly treat impeachment by character 
evidence and conduct, . . . by evidence of conviction of a crime, . . . and by showing religious beliefs or 
opinion.”). 
51 See 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 50, § 6206, at 598 (noting that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence “leave unanswered many questions surrounding the admissibility of prior consistent 
statements”).   
52 See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be . . . supported by testimony about the 
witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the 
form of an opinion about that character.  But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the 
witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.”).   
53 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-37 (noting that Rules 401 and 402 justify the 
admission of prior consistencies for repair purposes); see also Abel, 469 U.S. at 51 (discussing the 
continuing viability of impeachment for bias under Rules 401 and 402 despite an absence of specific 
rules governing impeachment technique). 
54 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence); id. 402 (providing for the admission of 
relevant evidence); id. 403 (allowing for the exclusion of relevant evidence with the potential to 
negatively impact a trial). 
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to repair the attack actually launched.55  Therefore, for prior consistent 
statements to be admissible under the Federal Rules for their traditional 
non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose, they must have some tendency to refute 
a specific attack made on the credibility of the witness.56  Further, the 
probative value of a rehabilitating prior consistent statement must not be 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or other dangers.57 
C.   The Federal Rules of Evidence and Hearsay Treatment of Prior 
Statements by Testifying Witnesses 
In approaching limits on the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the 
drafters of the Federal Rules took a much more hands-on approach, 
creating a comprehensive definition of hearsay in Rule 801;58 setting forth 
twenty-nine hearsay “exceptions” in Rules 803, 804, and 807;59 and 
classifying eight other statements as “not hearsay” under Rule 801(d)(1) 
and (d)(2).60  In crafting the Federal Rules of Evidence to replace and 
supplement purely common law evidentiary standards governing hearsay, 
drafters debated whether to include prior statements of testifying witnesses 
within the definition of hearsay at all.61  Some commentators argued for 
liberal admission of all prior statements of testifying witnesses because the 
witnesses may be subject to full cross-examination at trial.62  Others raised 
significant concerns about the broad admissibility of prior witness 
statements, positing that parties would rely on pre-prepared witness 
statements at trial and transform live testimony into an empty exercise.63  
These critics suggested that limitations should remain on the admissibility 
of witness hearsay offered at trial for the truth of the matter asserted.64 
                                                                                                                          
55 See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 318 (“[T]he judge has discretion under Rules 401 and 
403 to determine whether the particular circumstances justify admission of consistent statements to 
rehabilitate the witness.”).  
56 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-34 (“[N]ot every attack on credibility opens the 
door for rehabilitation with prior consistent statements; for example, if a witness is attacked for having 
an untruthful character, he cannot be rehabilitated with prior consistent statements because such 
statements do not respond to the attack that the witness has a character trait for lying.”). 
57 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
58 Id. 801. 
59 Id. 803, 804 & 807. 
60 Id. 801(d)(1), (d)(2). 
61 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee’s note (“Considerable controversy has 
attended the question whether a prior out-of-court statement by a person now available for cross-
examination concerning it, under oath and in the presence of the trier of fact should be classed as 
hearsay.”). 
62 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, 801-28 (“Many commentators have urged that as long as 
a witness is present at trial for cross-examination, there are adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, and 
that any statement . . . should be admissible.”). 
63 Id. at 801-28 (noting the House of Representatives’ restrictive view regarding prior witness 
statements and the “compromise” that became Rule 801(d)(1)). 
64 Id. 
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Ultimately, the Federal Rules of Evidence rejected expansive 
admissibility of prior witness statements and carved out only certain prior 
statements by testifying witnesses to be treated as “not hearsay” under the 
Rules.65  Prior inconsistent and consistent statements by trial witnesses that 
satisfy certain criteria may be considered for their truth by the fact-finder.66  
In addition, prior statements of identification by a trial witness may be 
considered for their truth under the Federal Rules.67 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permits substantive use of certain prior consistent 
statements made by testifying witnesses.  Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides: 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that 
meets the following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant 
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement: . . . 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered 
to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant 
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying . . . .68 
This hearsay exemption allows a prior consistency, admitted to 
rehabilitate a testifying witness after he is impeached for lying or improper 
motive or influence, to be used for its substantive, as well as its non-
hearsay rehabilitative purpose by the jury.69  Thus, if an opponent suggests 
on cross-examination that a witness’s testimony has been altered as a result 
of a bribe, for example, the proponent of that witness may admit a pre-trial 
statement the witness made before the alleged bribe that matches her trial 
testimony.  In this context, a prior consistent statement might be used for 
its non-hearsay purpose—the simple fact that the witness gave the same 
story before the alleged bribe strongly undermines the opponent’s 
suggestion that the trial version was concocted as a result of the bribe.  The 
                                                                                                                          
65 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).  
66 Id. 801(d)(1)(A), (B).  A prior inconsistent statement by a testifying witness subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement may be admitted if it was made under oath and at a prior trial, 
hearing, deposition, or other proceeding.  Id. 801(d)(1)(A). 
67 Id. 801(d)(1)(C).  
68 Id. 801(d)(1)(B).  The structure of the Rule was altered in the restyling project in 2011.  The 
restyling of the Rule did not alter its operation, however.  See id. 801 advisory committee’s note on 
2011 amendment (“The language of Rule 801 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the 
Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent 
throughout the rules.  These changes are intended to be stylistic only.  There is no intent to change any 
result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.”).     
69 See id. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“The prior statement is consistent with the 
testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in 
evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.”).   
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fact-finder need not depend on the truthfulness of the prior statement for it 
to serve this rehabilitative purpose, and this use of a prior consistency is 
permitted outside of the prohibition on hearsay pursuant to the standards of 
relevance and probative value articulated in Article Four of the Federal 
Rules.70  Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is, therefore, unnecessary to this use of a 
testifying witness’s prior consistent statement. 
Under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the proponent of the witness may go one 
step further and argue to the jury that it should accept the truth of the pre-
trial statement as well.71  Rather than rely simply on the existence of such a 
matching statement, the jury may depend on the accuracy of the pre-trial 
statement.  Therefore, the hearsay exemption for prior consistent 
statements expands the appropriate use of this already admissible 
evidence.72  In permitting the use of certain prior consistencies for their 
truth, the Advisory Committee relied upon the common law practice of 
admitting such witness statements for rehabilitation.73  Because these prior 
consistent statements were typically admitted and published to the fact-
finder for rehabilitative purposes, the question confronting the drafters of 
the Federal Rules was not whether these statements should be admitted, but 
rather what purpose they could serve after they were disclosed to the jury.  
The drafters chose to expand the permissible use of such prior consistent 
statements to allow the jury to consider such statements for their truth, as 
well as for their traditional rehabilitative purpose.74 
The Advisory Committee articulated two factors counseling in favor of 
the substantive use of the admitted statements.  First, the Advisory 
Committee Note emphasized that these pre-trial statements will be 
admitted to rehabilitate only when they match previously admitted trial 
testimony.75  It is the consistency between prior statements and trial 
testimony that makes them relevant to repair witness credibility.  
According to the Advisory Committee Note, the hearsay risks associated 
with out-of-court statements are less salient when they are accompanied by 
live testimony to the same effect.76  Second, the Advisory Committee 
                                                                                                                          
70 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
71 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“Under the rule, [prior consistent 
statements] are substantive evidence.”). 
72 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-35 (noting that the “Advisory Committee did 
intend to change the common-law rule, in a rather fundamental way”). 
73 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“Prior consistent statements 
traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive but not as substantive evidence.”). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee’s note (“If the witness admits on the stand that 
he made the statement and that it was true, he adopts the statement and there is no hearsay problem.”); 
see also SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-32 (noting that the substance of a prior consistent 
statement “is already before the factfinder by way of the witness’s in-court testimony”). 
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observed that prior consistencies only become relevant to rehabilitate a 
witness after opposing counsel opens the door to their admission with 
impeachment.77  The fact that the opponent of a prior consistent statement 
can exercise control over its admission through the choice of impeachment 
options further minimizes any perceived unfairness connected to the 
substantive use of prior consistencies.  In sum, the Advisory Committee 
adopted what could be characterized as a “why not” approach to the 
substantive use of prior consistent statements, noting that there is “no 
sound reason” why such statements “should not be received generally” 
once they are received for rehabilitative purposes.78 
The policy justifications originally articulated by the Advisory 
Committee for expanding the use of prior consistencies through Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) reflect a particular philosophical approach to the interaction 
between principles of rehabilitation and hearsay that arose naturally out of 
common law practice.  By emphasizing that prior consistent statements 
traditionally are admitted for rehabilitation purposes,79 the Advisory 
Committee Note assumes that the admissibility of such statements is 
governed by evidentiary rules outside of hearsay doctrine.  Thus the Note 
contemplates that the statements will be admitted outside the hearsay 
regime and will merely adapt that hearsay regime to the expected reality in 
which it will operate.  In addition, the original Advisory Committee Note 
provides a two-step analysis for the substantive use of prior consistent 
statements, with step one revolving around a proper rehabilitative non-
hearsay purpose for the statement and step two extending substantive 
privileges to statements admitted on that basis. 
Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence altered the common law 
approach to prior consistent statements covered by Rule 801(d)(1)(B), 
allowing them to be used for their truth, as well as for their palliative 
rehabilitative purpose.80  Under this Rule, the hearsay doctrine permits 
expanded use of prior consistent statements properly admitted for 
rehabilitation purposes long recognized under Article Four of the Rules 
and its common law antecedents. 
                                                                                                                          
77 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note. 
78 Id.  In contrast to certain prior consistencies admitted to rehabilitate, the Advisory Committee 
did articulate concern regarding the “general and indiscriminate use of previously prepared statements.”  
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note. 
79 See supra note 73. 
80 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (classifying prior consistent statements as “not hearsay” 
although they fit the definition of hearsay provided by Rule 801(a)–(c)); see also SALTZBURG ET AL., 
supra note 35, at 801-26 (noting that “[e]very one of the statements discussed in subdivision (d) of the 
Rule [801] comes within the hearsay rule as defined in subdivision (c)”). 
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D.   The Prior Consistent Statement Disconnect Under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence 
In drafting Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the Advisory Committee chose language 
tracking the commonly utilized method for repairing an attack on witness 
motivation or influence with a prior consistent statement.81  As discussed 
above, however, the type of impeachment referenced in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
is not the only type of impeaching attack that may be repaired with a prior 
consistency.  Prior consistent statements sometimes can serve to 
rehabilitate a witness whose memory or consistency has been attacked, in 
addition to a witness whose motivations have been challenged.82 
By choosing language specific to only one method of impeachment 
and rehabilitation, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence singled out 
one type of rehabilitative prior consistent statement for substantive use.83  
Under the Rule, prior consistent statements offered to repair attacks of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motivation may be considered 
for their truth.  Prior consistencies admitted to rehabilitate other types of 
impeaching attacks, such as on memory or witness consistency, have been 
left out in the cold.  Consistent with the common law approach to prior 
consistent statements generally, these prior consistencies may be used only 
for their non-hearsay rehabilitative purposes, if any, but may never be 
considered for their truth.84  For example, if an opponent suggests on cross-
examination that a witness has forgotten details of underlying events due to 
the passage of time, a prior statement by that witness made close in time to 
the underlying events that matches the trial testimony may rehabilitate the 
allegation of forgetfulness.  Accordingly, the prior consistent statement 
should be admitted for its non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose.  In contrast 
to prior consistencies admitted to repair attacks on witness motivations, 
however, this prior consistent statement could not be considered 
substantively because this type of prior consistency is not included within 
the language of the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) hearsay exemption.85  This 
disconnect between different breeds of prior consistent statements requires 
                                                                                                                          
81 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (defining a statement as not hearsay if it is “consistent with the 
declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant . . . acted 
from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying”). 
82 See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 149 (“A prior consistent statement of the witness may be 
admitted without reference to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) when relevant to rehabilitation in a manner other than 
refutation encompassed in Rule 801(d)(1)(B).”). 
83 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 159 (1995) (noting that the Rule singles out prior 
consistent statements used for only one type of rehabilitation). 
84 See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 151–52 (noting that such prior consistent statements 
may be admitted “for corroborative purposes only and not as substantive evidence.”); see also 
SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-33 (noting such statements “may be admitted only as proof 
of the witness’s credibility, and not as substantive evidence”). 
85 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
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that those admitted solely to rehabilitate outside the strictures of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) be accompanied by a limiting instruction informing the jury 
that the statement may be used to evaluate the credibility of the witness, 
but may not be taken as true.86   
This dichotomy between different breeds of prior consistent statements 
has existed in practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence since their 
adoption in 1975.87  Based upon the policies articulated by the Advisory 
Committee in adopting Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the reasons for this differential 
treatment are difficult to discern.  If a prior consistent statement is admitted 
to repair an impeaching attack on a witness’s memory, it too will be 
presented to the fact-finder.  Similarly, the statement will have to be 
consistent with previously received trial testimony to rehabilitate.  Finally, 
such a prior consistency will be helpful to repair only after the opponent 
opens the door with a challenge to the witness’s ability to recall.  
Notwithstanding these identical considerations, prior consistencies offered 
to repair attacks on memory are not admissible for their truth under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) and may be offered only for their non-hearsay purposes 
consistent with pre-Rules practice.  In 1995, the United States Supreme 
Court attempted to provide a justification for this differential treatment of 
prior consistencies and, in so doing, found an additional limitation 
embedded in Rule 801(d)(1)(B).  
E.  Tome v. United States:  The Supreme Court Weighs In 
In Tome v. United States, Petitioner Tome was convicted of sexually 
abusing his four-year-old daughter following a divorce that gave him 
primary custody of her.88  The victim was six and a half years old at the 
time of trial and had a difficult time on the stand.89  She gave “one- and 
two-word answers” on direct examination by the prosecution in response to 
“a series of leading questions” about the defendant’s conduct.90  The 
defense cross-examined the child over the course of two trial days, asking 
her 348 questions and suggesting that she concocted the story of abuse to 
avoid having to return to her father after spending summer vacation with 
her mother.91  The child appeared reluctant to answer questions about the 
alleged abuse and took as many as fifty-five seconds to respond to defense 
questions.92  On the second day of cross-examination, the child appeared to 
“be losing concentration” and the trial judge remarked “[w]e have a very 
                                                                                                                          
86 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
87 See supra note 44.  
88 Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 159 (1995).   
89 Id. at 153–54. 
90 Id. at 153.  
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
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difficult situation here.”93 
Following the child’s stilted testimony, the prosecution called six 
witnesses who testified to the victim’s out-of-court statements, revealing to 
the jury “a total of seven [hearsay] statements made by [the victim] 
describing the alleged sexual assaults.”94  In contrast to the victim’s trial 
testimony, these out-of-court statements very powerfully implicated Tome 
and offered significantly more detail regarding the alleged abuse than the 
child had managed to give on the stand.95  The trial court admitted all of 
the victim’s hearsay statements pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) over the 
objection of defense counsel, finding that the prior statements were 
consistent with the trial testimony and rebutted the defense’s implied 
accusation that her trial testimony was motivated by a desire to return to 
her mother.96   
Following his conviction, Tome appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the victim’s statements were 
not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) because they were all made after 
primary custody had been awarded to Tome at a time when the victim was 
similarly motivated to return to her mother.97  Tome argued that such 
postmotive consistent statements were equally likely to suffer from the 
custody motivations alleged by the defense and, hence, failed to refute the 
allegation of improper motivation.98  The Tenth Circuit affirmed Tome’s 
conviction, rejecting a hard and fast premotive limitation for prior 
consistent statements admitted through Rule 801(d)(1)(B).99  Specifically, 
the Tenth Circuit found that the proper scope of witness rehabilitation 
simply was not dictated by the hearsay provision of Rule 801(d)(1)(B):  
[T]he pre-motive requirement is a function of the relevancy 
rules, not the hearsay rules . . . [and] as a function of 
relevance, the pre-motive rule is clearly too broad . . . 
because it is simply not true that an individual with a motive 
to lie always will do so.100  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed Tome’s conviction, 
finding admission of the victim’s prior statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
erroneous.101  The Court held that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows admission of 
                                                                                                                          
93 Id. at 154. 
94 Id. 
95 See id. (describing testimony by the child’s babysitter that the girl stated that “she did not want 
to return to her father because he ‘gets drunk and he thinks I’m his wife’”).  
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 155.   
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993), overruled by 513 U.S. 150. 
101 Tome, 513 U.S. at 167.   
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prior consistent statements only if they were made prior to the time that the 
charged motive to fabricate arose.102  According to the Court, such a 
temporal premotive requirement was uniformly applied at common law in 
admitting prior consistent statements by witnesses impeached with an 
accusation of an improper motive.103  The Court found that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were designed to be interpreted consistently with 
common law standards in the absence of express language to the 
contrary.104  Finding no rejection of the “common law premotive” 
limitation in the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or in the Advisory Committee 
Notes, the Court held that the hearsay exemption implicitly mandated a 
similar “premotive” limitation.105  
According to the Court, such “premotive” prior consistent statements 
provide particularly compelling and reliable rebuttal of an impeaching 
attack.106  If a witness related the same story prior to the existence of a 
particular motive to lie, an opponent’s accusation that trial testimony was 
altered as a result of that motive is plainly refuted.107  Therefore, the Court 
reasoned that the premotive requirement justified extending a hearsay 
exemption to only one type of prior consistent statement: 
If consistent statements are admissible without reference to 
the timeframe we find imbedded in the Rule, there appears 
no sound reason not to admit consistent statements to rebut 
other forms of impeachment as well.  Whatever objections 
can be leveled against limiting the Rule to this designated 
form of impeachment and confining the rebuttal to those 
statements made before the fabrication or improper influence 
or motive arose, it is clear to us that the drafters of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) were relying upon the common-law temporal 
requirement.108   
Notwithstanding the temporal priority requirement imposed by Tome, 
the Court acknowledged the possibility that a postmotive statement might 
repair an impeaching attack under some circumstances.109  Still, the Court 
found that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would not allow the substantive use of such 
                                                                                                                          
102 Id. at 156. 
103 Id. at 155–56. 
104 See id. at 160 (noting that the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) tracks the language of common 
law cases, evincing an intent “to carry over the common-law premotive rule”). 
105 Id. 
106 See id. at 158 (explaining that charges of recent fabrication or improper motive are “capable of 
direct and forceful refutation through introduction of out-of-court consistent statements that predate the 
alleged fabrication, influence, or motive”). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 159 (emphasis added).    
109 Id. at 158–59. 
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postmotive prior consistent statements.110  In sum, the Tome Court 
articulated a “premotive” limitation implicitly embedded within Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) and posited that the existence of this inchoate requirement 
justified the dichotomy between prior consistencies admissible for their 
truth under the Rule and all others that may be admitted only for their non-
hearsay rehabilitative purposes.  
In so doing, the Supreme Court effected a subtle philosophical shift in 
the approach to rehabilitation taken by Article Eight of the Rules 
governing hearsay evidence.  In contrast to the approach reflected in the 
original Advisory Committee Note that presupposed that admissibility of 
prior consistencies would be decided under other rules, the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) discerned the drafters’ 
intention to regulate appropriate rehabilitation practices within Article 
Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  According to the Court, the 
drafters of the Federal Rules singled out only one type of prior consistent 
statement because of its unique rehabilitative reliability ensured by the 
silent premotive requirement.111  Although the dissent in Tome emphasized 
that rehabilitation requirements arise out of relevancy rules and not hearsay 
rules,112 the majority rejected that view and found that the Article Eight 
hearsay exemption was designed to cabin proper rehabilitation.113  
Accordingly, the Tome decision appeared to shift some of the authority for 
rehabilitation standards to the hearsay rules.  
F.  The Post-Tome Universe for Prior Consistent Statements 
At common law, all prior consistent statements admitted at trial were 
used similarly for their rehabilitative non-hearsay purpose.114  In contrast, 
following adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of it in Tome, prior consistent statements made by testifying 
witnesses are treated differently at trial depending on their timing and the 
type of impeaching attack to which they respond. 
                                                                                                                          
110 See id. at 158–59 (recognizing that there may be instances when postmotive out-of-court 
statements “have some probative force in rebutting a charge of fabrication or improper influence or 
motive,” but observing that “those statements refute the charged fabrication in a less direct and forceful 
way”). 
111 See id. at 157 (remarking that “the forms of impeachment within the Rule’s coverage are the 
ones in which the temporal requirement makes the most sense” because they are “capable of direct and 
forceful refutation”).  
112 See id. at 169 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The basic issue in this case concerns not hearsay, but 
relevance.”). 
113 See id. at 164 (majority opinion) (“That certain out-of-court statements may be relevant does 
not dispose of the question whether they are admissible.”). 
114 See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Premotive Prior Consistent Statements 
If a trial witness is accused of having an improper motive or influence, 
either expressly or impliedly, the proponent of the witness may seek to 
offer a prior statement by the witness that is consistent with the challenged 
trial testimony.  When this prior statement pre-dates the charged motive or 
influence upon the witness’s testimony, the fact-finder may consider the 
prior statement in evaluating the witness’s credibility and for its truth 
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).115  This is the use of premotive prior 
consistent statements sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Tome.116 
2.  Postmotive Prior Consistent Statements 
Following the Supreme Court’s Tome decision, courts have struggled 
with the proper approach to prior consistent statements made after the 
charged motive to fabricate arose.  Some courts have suggested that Tome 
may cover the waterfront for admission of prior consistent statements to 
rebut attacks on witness motivation, regulating both proper rehabilitation 
and hearsay.117  This view indicates that postmotive statements are 
inadmissible for any purpose.118  According to this view, postmotive prior 
consistent statements may not be utilized to rehabilitate impeached trial 
witnesses or for their truth.  As such, postmotive prior consistent 
statements are excluded altogether. 
In contrast, other courts have held that Tome controls the use of prior 
consistent statements for their truth pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B), but 
                                                                                                                          
115 See id. (holding that “[t]he Rule permits the introduction of a declarant’s consistent out-of-
court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when 
those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive”). 
116 Id. 
117 See, e.g., United States v. Lozada-Rivera, 177 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that, 
although the issue did not need to be addressed directly in the case at bar, “[i]t is a matter of some 
debate whether Rule 801(d)(1)(B) controls prior consistent statements of all stripes or whether a more 
relaxed test applies when a prior statement is offered for a rehabilitative purpose”); see also United 
States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1273 n.12 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing, prior to the Tome decision, that 
“[t]here is . . . no class of prior consistent statements, offered for purposes of rehabilitation, that does 
not fall within the literal scope of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)”). 
118 See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 315 (noting that some commentators read Tome as a 
“signal” that the premotive limitation applies to rehabilitative use of prior consistencies as well); 
SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-38 (reflecting the view that postmotive consistent statements 
“will not be admissible at all, either substantively or for impeachment purposes.”); see also REPORT OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES app. (2013), reprinted in COMM. ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AGENDA BOOK 832 (2013) 
[hereinafter Committee Note to Proposed Rule], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesA
ndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2011-06.pdf (noting that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) “led to 
some conflict in the cases,” with some courts distinguishing “between substantive and rehabilitative use 
for prior consistent statements, while others appeared to hold that prior consistent statements must be 
admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or not at all”). 
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does not regulate their use solely for rehabilitative purposes.119  These 
courts have found that postmotive prior consistent statements may be used 
to repair an impeached witness’s credibility when the trial judge, in the 
exercise of his or her discretion, finds that they rehabilitate.120  Even if 
these statements are published to the fact-finder for a limited credibility 
purpose, such postmotive prior consistent statements may not be used for 
their truth because they do not satisfy the premotive limitation announced 
in Tome.  This approach to prior consistent statements is reminiscent of the 
philosophy reflected in the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) regarding authority for proper rehabilitation—namely, that 
standards of rehabilitation are entirely governed by considerations of 
relevance and probative value and that the hearsay rules affect only 
substantive use. 
3.  Prior Consistent Statements that Repair Other Impeaching Attacks 
Although prior consistent statements have been used routinely to 
rehabilitate a trial witness whose motivations for testifying have been 
called into question, prior consistent statements can repair other types of 
impeaching attacks, as described above.121  For example, when a witness is 
accused of being forgetful at trial, a prior consistent statement that was 
made close in time to underlying events can constitute powerful 
rehabilitation.  In addition, the impeachment of a trial witness based upon 
some prior inconsistencies may be remedied by reference to prior 
consistencies that refute the attack—often by placing statements in context. 
While prior consistent statements may be introduced to respond to 
such impeachment methods, the statements may never be considered for 
their truth under these circumstances.122  Rule 801(d)(1)(B) expressly 
eliminates a hearsay objection to only one breed of prior consistent 
statement—one offered to rebut a charge of improper motive or influence 
or recent fabrication.123  Prior consistent statements that aim to repair 
attacks on memory or constancy do not fall within the narrow category 
defined by the hearsay exemption.124  Thus, while these prior consistent 
statements may be introduced as relevant rehabilitation evidence, they may 
be considered only for the non-hearsay purpose of assessing credibility and 
may never be relied upon for their truth by the fact-finder. 
                                                                                                                          
119 See United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2001) (describing the view that 
postmotive statements may be admitted for rehabilitation purposes as the “majority” view). 
120 See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, An Unneeded Hearsay Amendment: No Need to Expand 
Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements as Substantive Evidence, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 15, 2012, at 43 
(noting that many courts admit postmotive statements solely for rehabilitation purposes).  
121 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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*** 
The language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and Tome’s interpretation of it 
have affected the use of prior consistent statements at trial in multiple 
ways.  First, similarly situated prior consistent statements are treated 
differently.  Premotive prior consistent statements that repair attacks on 
motivation are admissible to rehabilitate, as well as for their truth.  All 
other prior consistent statements by a witness may be admitted for their 
credibility purposes alone, but may never be relied upon by the jury for 
their truth.  Second, this disparate treatment of similarly situated prior 
consistent statements has created a need for limiting instructions to caution 
jurors against considering prior consistent statements for their truth.  It is 
likely difficult for lay jurors to appreciate the subtle distinction between 
reliance upon pre-trial consistent witness statements solely for 
rehabilitative purposes and use of those statements for their truth.  Where 
the admitted prior statements, by definition, match trial testimony and are 
offered to evaluate the truth-telling of the witness on the stand, an 
instruction that warns the jury not to consider the matching consistent 
statement to be true is confusing to say the least.  Such confusion has led 
some to seek more uniformity with respect to admitted prior consistent 
statements.125 
III.  A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
In 2011, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence 
began formally considering an amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to bring 
uniformity to the treatment of prior consistent statements at trial.126  With 
the assistance of the Federal Judicial Center, federal district court judges 
were surveyed concerning a proposed amendment, and results of the 
survey were reported in March 2012.127  Following the survey, a revised 
                                                                                                                          
125 See May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that the proposal to amend 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) originated with Judge Frank W. Bullock during his tenure as a member of the 
Standing Committee).   
126 See Memorandum from the Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, Standing Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure, to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Evidence 
Procedure (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Repor
ts/EV04-2011.pdf (noting the “[p]ossible [a]mendment of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)” as an “[i]nformation 
[i]tem”).  Although formal consideration of the current proposal began in 2011, calls to amend Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) began more than a decade earlier.  See Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner, Prior 
Consistent Statements and the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509, 517 (1997) (advocating for 
substantive admissibility of all prior consistencies that are admissible to rehabilitate).   
127 FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 1.  The Federal Judicial Center developed the eight question 
email survey in collaboration with the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id.  The 
survey was sent to 961 federal district judges and fifty-three percent of the surveyed judges responded.  
Id.  This survey sought input regarding an early draft of the proposed amendment that discarded the 
existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) language in favor of a single standard allowing substantive use of all prior 
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version of the proposed amendment was published for notice and comment 
in 2012–2013.128  At its May 2013 meeting, the Advisory Committee 
approved a third and final draft Rule as a proposed amendment to Rule 
801(d)(1)(B).129 
A.  The Proposed Amendment to the Rule 
The proposed amendment would maintain the current language of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B), but would expand the Rule’s coverage to include prior 
consistent statements offered to rehabilitate types of impeaching attacks 
omitted from the existing provision.  The version of the amendment 
ultimately proposed by the Advisory Committee reads as follows: 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that 
meets the following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant 
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement: . . . 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is 
offered:  
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant 
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying; or  
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness 
when attacked on another ground; . . . .130 
In essence, the proposed amendment preserves the standard currently 
found in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the Tome premotive gloss on that standard.  
The amendment adds an additional category of prior consistencies 
available for substantive use, characterized as those “offered” to 
rehabilitate on grounds not covered by the original Rule.  The proposed 
Advisory Committee Note accompanying the amendment cites the 
                                                                                                                          
consistent statements “otherwise admissible to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness.”  Id. 
at 2. 
128 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, 
BANKRUPTCY, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: REQUEST FOR 
COMMENT 217 (2012) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/rules-published-comment.pdf; May 2013 Advisory Comm. 
Report, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that the Standing Committee approved the proposed amendment for 
publication at its June 2012 meeting).   
129 See May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that the proposed 
amendment and committee note were “modified slightly from the versions issued for publication to 
address certain concerns raised by public comment”).   
130 Id. at 3.  The emphases stress where the proposed language differs from the current version. 
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differential hearsay treatment of similarly situated prior consistent 
statements, as well as conflict in the case law, as reasons for the change.131  
Cautioning against liberal interpretation of the Rule to allow indiscriminate 
use of prior witness statements, the Advisory Committee Note emphasizes 
that principles of relevance and probative value continue to control 
decisions about admitting prior consistent statements for rehabilitation and 
clarifies that improper bolstering of a witness remains disallowed under the 
Rules.132  Finally, the Advisory Committee Note clarifies that the 
amendment preserves the ruling in Tome and maintains the premotive 
requirement for prior consistent statements offered to repair attacks of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motivation.133  
B.  Concerns and Criticisms 
The district court judges surveyed by the Federal Judicial Center with 
respect to an earlier version of the proposed amendment expressed support 
for the general expansion of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), with fifty-seven percent of 
responding judges approving of an amendment to the existing Rule.134  
However, the proposed amendment has encountered criticism and 
expressions of concern from the bar, the bench, and the academy.135 
First, some critics have discouraged adoption of the amendment by 
arguing that it aims to fix a non-existent problem.  Indeed, several 
commenters in the Federal Judicial Center survey made remarks such as 
“[i]f it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” and “this proposal [appears] to be a 
solution in search of a problem.”136  These critics, who raise no particular 
substantive objection to the amendment, believe that the current Rule 
functions well and appropriately.  Others commented that the issue of 
                                                                                                                          
131 See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 832 (noting the limited coverage of 
the original Rule).  
132 Id. at 833. 
133 Id. at 832. 
134 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 2325 (explaining that fifty-seven percent of surveyed 
judges disagreed with the statement “Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should not be amended” and concluding that 
the survey “showed substantial support for the proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B)”).  
135 See, e.g., id. at 8 (detailing comments from district court judges, including: “Allowing such 
statements could substantially bolster the weak in-court testimony of a questionable witness” and “This 
rule change would encourage a calculating declarant to deliberately contrive to take advantage of the 
Rule in contemplation of litigation”); see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (“The committee has 
not provided a compelling justification for further modifying the long-standing definition of hearsay.”); 
Comment from Honorable Joan N. Ericksen to Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure 4 (Dec. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Judge Ericksen Comment], available at http://ww
w.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2012-evidence-comments/12-EV-001-comment.pdf 
(“Short of foregoing cross-examination altogether, it will be difficult for an opponent to have any 
control over whether a testifying declarant will be deemed to need some rehabilitation of his 
‘credibility as a witness.’”). 
136 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 20, 23 (responding to “Question Eight” regarding whether 
any amendment should be proposed). 
 962 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:937 
limited use of prior consistent statements arises so infrequently in actual 
trial practice that any perceived problem simply is not worth remedying.137  
While these critics do not assert any danger associated with expanding the 
Rule, they simply deem change unnecessary. 
Other commentators have expressed more substantive concerns 
regarding the fair operation of an amended Rule.  These critics fear a 
drastic increase in the use of prior witness statements at trial arising from 
an amendment.138  According to this criticism, a rule that allows for 
expanded use of admitted prior consistent statements will lead to an 
increase in admission of such statements.  Indeed, the federal district 
judges surveyed overwhelmingly predicted that an amendment would lead 
to increased admission of prior consistent statements at trial.139  Under this 
view, an amendment to the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) hearsay exemption could be 
interpreted as a blessing for admission of all prior consistent statements 
made by impeached trial witnesses.140  As commentators have observed: 
“The risk of an unbridled use of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is . . . that the Trial 
Court may play fast and loose with principles of relevance, shifting the 
trial from a focus on in-court witnesses to out-of-court statements.”141  
Critics fear that an amended provision could undercut the original 1975 
compromise that treats out-of-court witness statements as hearsay with 
only limited exceptions.142  These commentators anticipate that expanded 
application of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will lead litigants to rely heavily upon 
prepared pre-trial witness statements rather than on the preferred in-court 
trial testimony under oath and subject to cross-examination.143 
                                                                                                                          
137 See, e.g., id. at 3 (“This issue has never come up in seventeen years on the federal bench.”). 
138 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (criticizing the proposal that would “significantly 
expand the admissibility of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence”); Judge Ericksen 
Comment, supra note 135, at 34 (“[I]t seems inevitable that more prior statements would be heard by 
fact-finders under the amended rule.”).  
139 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 9 (showing that seventy-two percent of federal district 
judges agreed there would be greater admission of prior consistent statements under the amendment); 
id. at 25 (“The survey also showed support for the empirical prediction that the amendment would lead 
to an increase in prior consistent statements coming into evidence.”). 
140 See Judge Ericksen Comment, supra note 135, at 4 (suggesting that the amendment could 
permit substantive use of prior consistent statements whenever a testifying witness needs “some 
rehabilitation of his ‘credibility as a witness’”). 
141 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-37.   
142 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (noting that Federal Rules rejected a liberal approach 
that would have allowed admission of all prior statements by testifying witnesses). 
143 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 24 (“It won’t take long for lawyers to recognize this 
amendment as a way to build a case with out-of-court statements.”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court opined 
that liberal substantive admission of prior consistent statements could “shift” the “whole emphasis of 
the trial . . . to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones.”  Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 
165 (1995). 
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IV.  TO AMEND OR NOT TO AMEND:  THAT IS THE QUESTION 
The proposal to amend Rule 801(d)(1)(B) raises three crucial 
questions.  First, is any proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
supported by sound evidentiary and rule-making policy?  Second, 
notwithstanding any beneficial policy justifications, is the proposed 
amendment likely to create unintended consequences and to open the 
floodgates to expansive use of prior consistent statements at trial?  Finally, 
if there are both sound justifications for an amendment, as well as 
significant trial risks, are there any alternatives to the current proposal that 
could promote logical evidentiary policy while minimizing the risk of 
improvident use of prior consistent statements?   
A.   A Laudable Goal:  Consistent and Rational Operation of Evidence 
Rules 
Extending Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to cover all prior consistent statements 
admitted to rehabilitate a testifying witness is in keeping with the policies 
reflected in the original Advisory Committee Note explaining the hearsay 
exemption.  As described above, the Advisory Committee Notes reveal 
several justifications for allowing substantive use of prior consistent 
statements that rehabilitate.   
First, the hearsay exemption does not give the fact-finder access to out-
of-court statements that it would not otherwise receive.144  Under the Rule, 
prior consistent statements may be considered for their truth only if they 
are admissible for a non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose.145  Thus, the 
hearsay exemption merely allows for greater use of out-of-court statements 
already received by the fact-finder.  Second, the statements at issue must 
be “consistent” with trial testimony already subject to cross-examination in 
order to qualify as rehabilitative.146  Allowing substantive use of out-of-
court statements that merely echo previously received trial testimony 
decreases the core hearsay risk—i.e., that unreliable out-of-court 
statements will be used to build a case.147  Third, such prior consistent 
statements may be offered for their non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose only 
if the opponent of those statements first opens the door with a specific 
impeaching attack on the testifying witness that makes prior consistencies 
                                                                                                                          
144 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (noting that such statements 
“traditionally have been admissible”). 
145 See supra text accompanying notes 68–69, 72. 
146 See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“The prior statement is consistent 
with the testimony given on the stand . . . .”). 
147 See David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1516 (noting that 
one of the traditional justifications for the hearsay rule is the unreliability of out-of-court statements). 
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relevant to repair.148  Therefore, the party opponent may control access to 
prior consistent statements through careful consideration of impeachment 
strategies.149 
Logically exploring these policy considerations reveals that the 
existing Rule is under-inclusive in permitting substantive use of prior 
consistent statements that rebut attacks of recent fabrication or improper 
motive only.150  Importantly, the articulated justifications for allowing 
substantive use of prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
apply equally when prior consistent statements are admitted to rehabilitate 
attacks on memory and consistency.  The fact-finder necessarily has access 
to these prior consistent statements for their non-hearsay rehabilitative 
value.  The value in such statements arises out of their consistency with 
trial testimony already given by the declarant subject to in court cross-
examination.  Finally, these prior consistent statements are admissible only 
after the opponent opens the door with a triggering challenge to witness 
memory or consistency.  Based upon the stated rationale for permitting the 
hearsay exemption in existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B), there is no satisfactory 
reason to limit the hearsay exemption to one type of rehabilitative prior 
consistent statement alone. 
It is true that many out-of-court statements may be admissible solely 
for their limited non-hearsay purposes in some circumstances, but 
admissible for their truth in others.151  Indeed, this is a fundamental feature 
of hearsay doctrine, and there is nothing irrational about such differential 
treatment of out-of-court statements in most contexts.  It is critical, 
however, to have some logical basis for drawing the line between those 
statements that may be admitted for their truth and those that may not.  In 
contexts outside of the prior consistent statement, such a rational 
distinction exists and can be understood and defended.  Because the 
policies underlying existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) apply equally to other prior 
consistent statements not captured by its language, a logical distinction is 
lacking in this context.   
In contrast, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides a hearsay exemption for a 
limited class of prior inconsistent statements made by testifying 
                                                                                                                          
148 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 126, at 51213 (“[C]ourts [have] held prior consistent 
statements inadmissible when offered during direct testimony, and admitted such statements only after 
impeachment . . . .”). 
149 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“[I]f the opposite party wishes to 
open the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received 
generally.”). 
150 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). 
151 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., EVIDENCE PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 1.14, at 51 
(4th ed. 2012) (“Out-of-court statements may be admitted for many limited purposes even if the 
hearsay doctrine would block their use to prove what they assert.”). 
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witnesses.152  Only prior inconsistent statements that were made under oath 
and in a prior trial, hearing, deposition or other proceeding may be 
admitted for their truth.153  Of course, any prior inconsistent statement 
made by a testifying witness in any context may be used for the limited 
purpose of impeaching the witness’s testimony.154  To discredit the 
witness, the prior inconsistency need not be “true,” however.  The fact that 
a witness made a statement that differs from her trial version demonstrates 
vacillation that may lead the fact-finder to question credibility regardless of 
which version is accurate.155  Limited non-hearsay use of prior inconsistent 
statements outside the Rule 801(d)(1)(A) requirements necessitates a 
limiting instruction to the fact-finder cautioning against substantive 
consideration of the prior statement.156  In the arena of prior 
inconsistencies, therefore, it is textbook evidence law that some may be 
used for their truth, while others may be used for their limited non-hearsay 
impeachment value only.157 
There is a very logical basis for distinguishing among different prior 
inconsistent statements made by testifying witnesses, however.  First, these 
out-of-court statements are by definition inconsistent with trial 
testimony—meaning that they conflict with what the witness testified to 
under oath before the jury.  To allow the jury to utilize such out-of-court 
inconsistencies for their truth is to permit the jury to reject the live 
testimony, currently being offered by the witness under oath and subject to 
penalty of perjury, in favor of a contradictory version provided at some 
other time.  Before allowing the rejection of trial evidence in favor of 
hearsay, the Rules demand some guarantee that the prior statement is 
sufficiently reliable to be afforded such treatment.158  Thus, the oath and 
prior proceeding requirements for the substantive use of prior 
inconsistencies are designed to provide some assurance that the out-of-
court version is especially worthy of belief.159  This special reliability 
                                                                                                                          
152 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
153  Id.  This hearsay exemption also requires that the declarant testify at trial and be subject to 
cross examination about the prior statement.  Id. 
154 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-29 (noting that prior inconsistencies that do not 
meet the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) “may be used only for impeachment purposes”). 
155 See id. at 801-28 (noting value of prior inconsistencies to test witness credibility without 
regard to truth). 
156 See id. at 801-29 (“[T]he nonoffering party is entitled to a limiting instruction that the 
statement is to be used only for impeachment purposes.”). 
157 Id.  
158 See id. at 801-28 (noting congressional concern over reliability of prior inconsistencies 
afforded substantive use). 
159 See id. (explaining that Rule 801(d)(1)(A) represents a “compromise” between the Advisory 
Committee’s liberal approach to the admission of prior witness statements and the restrictive approach 
espoused by the House of Representatives); see also id. at 801-32 (“Because the party offering an 
inconsistent statement as substantive evidence wants the trier of fact to accept it as true, and in 
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concern inherent in the substantive use of inconsistencies rationally 
justifies disparate treatment of prior inconsistent statements made in 
different contexts.  Additionally, a limiting instruction cautioning jurors to 
disregard the truth of a prior inconsistent statement is likely to make sense 
where jurors are asked to disregard an out-of-court statement that 
substantively conflicts with the trial testimony.  Where a witness gives 
conflicting versions of events, lay jurors may readily comprehend a 
command to disregard one version due to its questionable reliability. 
Where the stated policies supporting substantive use of prior 
consistencies under existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) apply equally to all prior 
consistencies admitted to rehabilitate, there is no rational basis for the 
hearsay/non-hearsay distinction currently being drawn under the Rule.  
Furthermore, the fact that the hearsay statements at issue are consistent 
with previous trial testimony sets the stage for a uniquely 
incomprehensible limiting instruction to the jury.  Without a hearsay 
exception, jurors must be told to use a prior consistent statement to 
evaluate the “credibility” of the witness’s trial testimony only, but not to 
accept the out-of-court statement as true.160  But, if jurors decide to believe 
or “credit” the testifying witness—in part because of the existence of the 
prior consistent statement—jurors are, in essence, accepting the “truth” of 
the out-of-court statement as well, because it matches the trial testimony.  
A lay jury may well be confused as to what use to make of the statement if 
they are prohibited from “accepting” its substance.161  Indeed, eighty-four 
percent of surveyed federal district judges agreed that the limiting 
instructions accompanying prior consistent statements that fall outside of 
existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are difficult for jurors to follow.162 
The incoherence of the limiting instruction accompanying a prior 
consistency admitted for its non-hearsay purpose is not an indictment of 
limiting instructions generally.  Noted evidence scholar, Professor David 
Sklansky, recently examined the efficacy of limiting and other evidentiary 
instructions, concluding that some instructions work better than others and 
calling for a “context-specific weighing of the likelihood that an 
                                                                                                                          
preference to trial testimony, arguably greater circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness should be 
required than in the case of consistent statements.”).  
160 See id. at 801-38 (“Where a consistent statement is admissible for other, rehabilitative 
purposes such as to explain an inconsistency, and yet is not admissible as substantive evidence under 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the adversary is entitled to a limiting instruction as to the appropriate use of the 
evidence.”). 
161 See PARK ET AL., supra note 11, at 270 (noting that rehabilitative use of a prior consistent 
statement “can lead to a truly unintelligible limiting instruction”); SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 
801-38 (remarking that limiting instructions to disregard consistent witness statements are “unlikely to 
be understood by a jury”). 
162 FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 2. 
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evidentiary instruction will work and the costs of it failing.”163  Professor 
Sklansky observed that limiting instructions given in mock juror 
experiments appear to function better when jurors are given an explanation 
or basis for the limitation that they can comprehend—such as that hearsay 
evidence is not “reliable.”164  He opined: “[I]f we cannot come up with an 
explanation for the instruction that will make sense to jurors[,] [t]hen it 
may be a good time to reexamine the rule that the instruction attempts to 
implement.”165 
Professor Sklansky’s analysis highlights the shortcomings in the 
limiting instructions required under existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B).  When 
evaluated in context, it is apparent that jurors will have difficulty 
comprehending why they must disregard the substance of a statement that 
merely echoes trial testimony they are told to consider.  In the unique 
circumstance of the prior consistent statement, telling jurors that the out-
of-court statement is “unreliable” could undercut its very purpose in 
repairing the credibility of the witness and confuse jurors as to the 
appropriate use they are to make of the consistent statement.  Without a 
rational explanation, the limiting instruction is likely to be ineffective.  
Crafting a more comprehensible instruction in this area has proved elusive.   
Therefore, reconsideration of the hearsay rule that necessitates the 
limiting instruction is in order.  If the jury’s consideration of the prior 
consistency presented a significant risk to a fair trial outcome, an 
appropriate remedy would be to exclude the prior consistency altogether—
even for rehabilitative purposes.166  Because the out-of-court statement is, 
by definition, consistent with testimony given at trial by the witness subject 
to cross-examination, there appears to be little cost to the trial process if 
the limiting instruction fails.  In this context, therefore, permitting full use 
of all admitted prior consistencies would be a superior change in the 
operation of the Rules that would eliminate altogether the need for an 
ineffective and confusing jury instruction.   
Thus, the disparate treatment of similarly situated prior consistent 
statements is not simply an example of the traditional limited admissibility 
of some out-of-court statements.  In seeking a rational and uniform 
                                                                                                                          
163 Sklansky, supra note 25, at 446; see id. at 429 (“Sometimes evidentiary instructions work, 
sometimes they fail, and sometimes they backfire.  Sometimes the effectiveness of the instruction 
depends on the seriousness of the charge; sometimes it depends on the personality of the jurors; 
sometimes it depends on how much stress is put on the instruction or what kind of stress; and 
sometimes none of that seems to matter.”).   
164 See id. at 438 (“Clearly, jurors respond to specific information they can understand and 
appreciate.” (quoting Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to 
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 486 (2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).   
165 Id. at 447. 
166 See id. at 444 (“If we thought jurors could not or would not follow [the limiting] instruction, 
we would have to choose between either excluding the evidence or admitting it for all purposes.”). 
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approach to the admissibility of prior consistent statements, the proposed 
amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) promotes an important and laudable 
objective.  Of course, the entire purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
is to encourage a trial process driven by logic and fairness.167  Rules that 
draw illogical or even arbitrary distinctions create confusion among judges, 
litigants, and jurors.  The proposal to amend Rule 801(d)(1)(B) nicely 
aligns with a model of clear and consistent rule-making and, as suggested 
by an early draft of a proposed Advisory Committee Note, merely “extends 
the argument made in the original Advisory Committee Note to its logical 
conclusion.”168 
B.  Lost in Translation:  Theory vs. Practice 
Notwithstanding the policy justifications for the amendment, there has 
been significant concern that an amendment would pave the way for 
unfettered use of pre-trial witness statements as evidence.169  In theory, the 
proposed amendment should not increase the number of prior consistent 
statements admitted at trial.170  This is because the prior consistent 
statements it covers—those that repair attacks on a testifying witness’s 
memory or inconsistency—are admissible under currently existing rules, 
albeit for their limited rehabilitative purpose.171  As a result of the 
amendment, these already admissible prior consistent statements will 
simply be put to greater use as substantive evidence.  Accordingly, the 
amendment should not alter the volume of prior consistent statements 
being admitted at trial under existing rules.  Viewed in this light, the 
proposed amendment could be expected to have little negative impact on 
trial proceedings.172 
Critics of the proposed amendment reject this vision of its impact on 
the trial process as overly simplistic and unrealistic.  Opponents of the 
proposed amendment predict that its adoption will open the floodgates to 
admitting prior consistencies—which are not currently admitted—for any 
purpose at all.173  Indeed, federal district judges overwhelmingly predicted 
an increase in the admission of prior consistent statements under an 
amended Rule.174  There are two principal reasons why this might be the 
                                                                                                                          
167 See FED. R. EVID. 102 (outlining the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
168 PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 128, at 218. 
169 See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. 
170 See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833 (“The amendment does not 
make any consistent statement admissible that was not admissible previously . . . .”).  
171 Id. 
172 The biggest impacts the amendment would have under this view would be the positive ones of 
eliminating confusing and possibly misleading limiting instructions and allowing appellate scrutiny of 
admitted prior consistencies.   
173 See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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case, one pragmatic and the other theoretical. 
1.  The Amended Rule in the Courtroom 
The pragmatic reason for possible increased admission of prior 
consistent witness statements at trial stems from increased litigant reliance 
on prior consistencies following the amendment.  Litigants may have 
neglected to proffer admissible prior consistencies under the existing 
Rule,175 but may be motivated to do so under an amended version.  While 
litigants may appreciate the admissibility of prior consistent statements 
offered to repair attacks on memory and consistency under the existing 
rules, litigants also must realize that they are only admissible for their non-
hearsay purpose.  Without the ability to argue the truth of such admitted 
prior consistent statements and recognizing that they must be accompanied 
by cumbersome limiting instructions, lawyers may conclude that these 
non-hearsay prior consistent statements are not worth the effort.  In the 
event of an amendment that affords substantive use to these prior 
consistent statements and permits a closing argument based upon their 
truth, prior consistent witness statements in these categories may become 
more attractive to litigants and may be proffered far more often.  Under 
this scenario, an amendment could do much more than afford substantive 
effect to statements already being published to juries under existing rules; 
it may increase drastically the number of prior consistent statements 
offered at trial.176 
The theoretical response to this potential for more aggressive use of 
prior consistencies is that well-established limitations, outside of hearsay 
doctrine, govern the trial judge’s decision about proper rehabilitation.  As 
described above, use of a prior consistent statement must follow an 
impeaching attack on the witness and the prior consistency must repair the 
attack launched.177  Neither of these fundamental rehabilitation principles 
would be disturbed by an amended Rule.  Indeed, the proposed Advisory 
Committee Note to the amendment very strongly emphasizes the continued 
applicability of these common law limitations on rehabilitation.178  While 
an amendment certainly could encourage party attempts to use prior 
consistencies more often, trial judges would retain full control over the 
decision about rehabilitation (which triggers substantive use under the 
                                                                                                                          
175 See id. at 3 (presenting the comment of one district judge who indicated that the issue of 
limited admissibility of prior consistent statements had not come up once in seventeen years of trying 
federal cases).  
176 This could be one reason that district judges predicted an increase in admission of prior 
consistent statements. 
177 See supra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text.  
178 See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833 (“As before, prior consistent 
statements under the amendment may be brought before the factfinder only if they properly rehabilitate 
a witness whose credibility has been attacked.”). 
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proposal). 
If the newly proffered prior consistent statements properly repair 
impeachment of a witness, they should be admitted, in which case there is 
little harm in allowing them to be used for their truth as well.  This is the 
point of the amendment.  If, on the other hand, lawyers begin 
indiscriminately offering prior consistent statements that fail to rehabilitate 
properly and simply attempt to bolster witnesses and build cases from 
prepared out-of-court statements, opponents may object that those prior 
consistent statements have little or no tendency to repair the impeachment 
and should be excluded altogether.  Even if proffered prior consistencies 
have some slight rehabilitative value, litigants may argue that such value is 
substantially outweighed by their tendency to add additional hearsay 
information to the proponent’s case.  To be sure, this process will demand 
vigilance by opponents of prior consistent statements and active oversight 
by trial judges.179  Although this may be viewed as burdensome for trial 
judges, it represents no change from existing practice: The Federal Rules 
of Evidence currently leave rehabilitation questions to development by 
judges on a case-by-case basis.180  Therefore, interpreted as intended, the 
proposed amendment does not pave the way for indiscriminate use of pre-
trial witness statements even if litigants proffer them with more frequency. 
However, it is important to place the theory behind the proposed 
amendment within the courtroom context in which it will play its part.  
Significantly, surveyed federal district judges, who will be responsible for 
policing an amended Rule, have predicted that trial judges will allow many 
more prior consistent statements to be admitted in the wake of the 
amendment.181  A philosophical shift in the approach to prior consistent 
statements in the courtroom since the enactment of the Rules and the Tome 
decision may impair judicial efforts to combat any onslaught of proffered 
prior consistencies in the wake of an amendment. 
2.  The Philosophical Clash with Tome 
When Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was enacted, it entered a common law trial 
landscape in which prior consistent statements were admissible only for 
their non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose.182  In this litigation climate, 
judges and lawyers were required to discern and articulate the non-hearsay 
purpose for admitting any prior consistency.  The proposed amendment 
                                                                                                                          
179 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that because “the amendment ties admissibility to 
the need for rehabilitation, . . . [which] all witnesses need . . . to some degree” and consequently shifts a 
trial judge’s focus to “tricky” 403 issues about the “credibility and weighing [of] the evidence,” trial 
judges will inherit enhanced duties on the use of prior consistent statements in court). 
180 Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833. 
181 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that only thirty-five percent of surveyed judges 
thought that trial judges would or could stem the flow of prior consistencies into evidence). 
182 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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currently under review would enter a very different trial landscape that has 
evolved since the enactment of the Rules in 1975 and the Tome decision in 
1995.  In the post-Rules universe, judges and lawyers are accustomed to 
looking at Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to determine admissibility of prior 
consistencies.  Accordingly, the independent focus on non-hearsay 
rehabilitation purposes for prior consistent statements has likely 
diminished since the door to substantive use was opened through Rule 
801(d)(1)(B).183  This philosophical shift in the approach to prior consistent 
statements under the Rules and Tome may make it difficult for litigants and 
judges to police any significant uptick in the use of prior consistent 
statements effectively following an amendment to the Rule. 
Viewing the proposed amendment through the lens of current practice 
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), there is genuine reason to fear that it may not be 
applied as intended.  In the fast-paced context of a jury trial, many lawyers 
and judges may fail to recognize the somewhat nuanced interaction 
between rehabilitation and hearsay embodied in the amendment.  Litigants 
may ignore the two-step process that governs the substantive use of prior 
consistent statements under the amendment and may assume that Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) represents a proxy for prior consistent statement admission.  
In other words, litigants might conclude that a prior consistent statement 
may be admitted and used substantively whenever it “fits” the amended 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) language without further inquiry regarding the specific 
impeachment launched or the relevance of the proffered consistency to 
repair. 
This tendency may be exacerbated by the traditional approach to 
hearsay exceptions and exemptions in the courtroom.  Once litigants 
identify a hearsay exception applicable to a particular out-of-court 
statement, they may naturally skip any analysis of the potential limited 
non-hearsay use of such a statement.  For example, if a declarant expressed 
her then-existing state of mind out of court and that state of mind became 
relevant in a subsequent trial, a lawyer would likely argue that the Rule 
803(3) hearsay exception provides for the admission of the statement.184  
Knowing there is an available hearsay exception that paves the way to 
admit the statement for its truth, an advocate need not undertake a careful 
analysis of whether the statement could be admitted for its limited non-
                                                                                                                          
183 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 19 (“[I]t opens the door to argument[s] about when a 
witness’s credibility has been challenged rather than specifying what type of challenge triggers the use 
of the prior statement[s].”); id. (“I have a concern with the proposed amendment because I do not know 
what is meant by the words ‘otherwise admissible.’ . . . I would better understand the proposed 
amendment if the words . . . were changed to ‘offered.’”); id. (“What does ‘otherwise admissible’ to 
rehabilitate mean?”). 
184 See FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (providing a hearsay exception for statements of declarant’s then-
existing state of mind). 
 972 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:937 
hearsay value in demonstrating circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s 
state of mind.   
Under the proposed hearsay exemption embodied in amended Rule 
801(d)(1)(B), however, there remains an assumption that prior consistent 
witness statements are inadmissible hearsay.  That is, proponents must 
identify a valid non-hearsay purpose for admission of a prior consistent 
statement.  Only if the out-of-court statement could be admitted for a 
limited purpose does the amended Rule permit substantive use.185  Lawyers 
and judges might mistakenly interpret an amended Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in 
traditional fashion, however, and conclude that there is no need for a 
thoughtful evaluation of the non-hearsay value of a prior consistent 
statement now that an exemption paves the way for substantive use.  
Indeed, comments made in the course of the Federal Judicial Center survey 
reflect such misunderstanding.186  If the proposed amendment ultimately 
takes effect, it will be the only hearsay exception or exemption that 
requires independent consideration of the non-hearsay value of a statement 
as the exclusive condition precedent to substantive availability.187  As the 
lone exemption with such operation, the proposed amendment to Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) risks misapplication.  As currently configured, the amended 
Rule could be interpreted to bless and automatically admit any prior 
consistent statement offered to repair an impeaching attack.  
This view of the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is not simply the result of lawyer 
ignorance: the Supreme Court’s decision in Tome may have much to do 
with creating it.  By mandating a premotive requirement in the hearsay 
Rule, the Supreme Court suggested that the hearsay exemption does 
regulate proper rehabilitation.188  Consequently, lawyers and judges alike 
may have adopted the view that a prior consistent statement is (1) 
admissible and (2) available for substantive use whenever it fits the 
language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B).  Indeed, this is true of the existing Rule.  If 
the specific impeaching attack of recent fabrication or improper influence 
or motive outlined in the current Rule is made and the proffered prior 
statement is both consistent with the witness’s trial testimony and a 
                                                                                                                          
185 See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 832–33 (“The amendment does not 
change the traditional and well-accepted limits on bringing prior consistent statements before the 
factfinder for credibility purposes.”). 
186 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 5 (“If it is not hearsay, why is a limiting instruction being 
given?”); id. at 15 (“If the statements would be admissible for substantive purposes, what would be the 
source of the unfair prejudice that would support a ruling to exclude the evidence under Rule 403?”). 
187 Although Rule 801(d)(1)(A) demands “inconsistency” for a prior witness statement that is 
crucial to non-hearsay impeachment value, substantive availability ultimately turns on the context of 
the out-of-court statement.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (requiring that an inconsistent statement be 
made under oath and at a prior trial, hearing, deposition, or other proceeding for substantive 
availability).  
188 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (holding that the hearsay exemption 
requires premotive statements for proper rehabilitation). 
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premotive statement, it will satisfy both rehabilitation concerns and 
hearsay concerns and be admitted for its truth.  All of the components of 
admissibility for rehabilitative purposes and substantive use are embodied 
in that single self-contained provision.  Therefore, practice under the 
existing Rule may have evolved into a one-step analysis focused entirely 
on Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and neglecting any independent assessment of 
rehabilitative value.  In other words, many lawyers and judges may use 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a simple shorthand for appropriate rehabilitation with 
prior consistent statements, offering and allowing statements that fall 
within the confines of the Rule and ignoring those that do not.189   
Transferring this interpretation of existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to the 
proposed amendment could lead to the more frequent admission of prior 
consistent statements decried by critics.  All prior consistent statements 
proffered after any impeaching attack on a witness not within the original 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) category could be seen as automatically (1) admissible 
to rehabilitate and (2) available for substantive use under the Rule.  
Notwithstanding the cautionary statements in the proposed commentary 
regarding appropriate rehabilitation, litigants may be lulled into a false 
sense of security that the rehabilitation requirement is automatically 
satisfied for any prior consistent statement falling within the amended 
Rule.190 
First, while the amended provision is premised upon the original two-
step analysis behind the hearsay exemption that allows substantive use of 
statements already admissible to rehabilitate, it preserves the well-
recognized Tome category in its first clause and expressly ratifies the Tome 
premotive requirement in the proposed Advisory Committee Note.191  This 
adoption of Tome may signal acceptance of the Tome philosophy that Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) regulates the proper scope of rehabilitation, in addition to 
hearsay.  This philosophical bent could cause judges and litigants to 
assume that the amendment also covers both issues of appropriate 
rehabilitation and hearsay and to neglect a careful independent assessment 
of the rehabilitation value of proffered prior consistent statements. 
Second, the specific language chosen for the new clause of the 
proposed amendment may exacerbate litigants’ tendency to presume that 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) defines allowable rehabilitation.  The new clause 
                                                                                                                          
189 Indeed, several comments made by district judges in the FJC Survey reflect such a one-step 
approach to prior consistencies.  See, e.g., FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that the “current 
language [of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)] places a governor on admissibility”); id. at 10 (opining that the 
amendment creates a “new avenue of admissibility” for prior consistencies); id. at 15 (“If the 
statements [are] admissible for substantive purposes [under the amendment], what would be the source 
of the unfair prejudice that would support a ruling to exclude the evidence under Rule 403?”). 
190 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 168 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he 
promulgated Rule says what it says, regardless of the intent of its drafters.”). 
191 Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 832. 
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provides that a statement is “not hearsay” if the declarant testifies at trial 
subject to cross-examination and the statement is consistent with the 
declarant’s testimony and “is offered . . . to rehabilitate the declarant’s 
credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground.”192  This 
language may signal that hearsay concerns disappear whenever a prior 
consistent statement is “offered” to rehabilitate an impeached witness.  So 
interpreted, the Rule could be seen to bless the use of prior consistencies 
both for repair and substance any time a witness is impeached on “another 
ground” and the proponent of the witness “offers” a prior consistent 
statement in an effort to “rehabilitate [the] declarant’s credibility as a 
witness.”193  A proponent of a prior consistency need only explain that he 
is “offering” the statement for repair following “impeachment” of his 
witness to track the language of the amendment and argue for admission 
and substantive use of the statement.   
The key to proper application of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is careful 
contextual evaluation of impeachment and proffered rehabilitation by the 
trial judge in advance of consideration of substantive use of a prior 
statement.  Should trial judges neglect this contextual rehabilitation 
analysis in favor of more rote admission under the proposed amendment, 
some of the concerns expressed about expansive use of prior consistent 
statements may be legitimate.   
For example, trial judges may feel comfortable allowing prior 
consistent statements to be admitted pursuant to subsection (ii) of the 
proposed amendment whenever an opponent references a prior inconsistent 
statement.  Yet, it is not the case that all suggestions of a prior 
inconsistency will be ameliorated by a prior consistency.194  If the prior 
consistent statement was made at or near the time of the alleged 
inconsistency, it may repair the attack by suggesting that the witness did 
not vacillate and that the proffered inconsistency was never really 
inconsistent after all.195  In that case, the prior consistent statement 
rehabilitates and should be admitted and available for substantive use.196  
Conversely, if the proponent of a witness seeks to counter an attack with a 
prior inconsistent statement by demonstrating that the trial witness made a 
statement consistent with trial testimony at some other time, this prior 
consistent statement may not respond to the attack on the witness’s 
constancy.  The fact that the witness made statements in keeping with trial 
                                                                                                                          
192 May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 3 (emphasis added). 
193 Judge Ericksen Comment, supra note 135, at 4. 
194 See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 315–16 (noting that some inconsistencies “remain[] 
despite all consistent statements”).   
195 Id. § 47, at 316. 
196 See id. (asserting that certain circumstances may make prior consistent statements relevant to 
rehabilitate the witness). 
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testimony at some times does not undercut the impeaching sting of 
vacillation demonstrated by inconsistencies at other times.  Therefore, such 
a prior consistent statement does not rehabilitate the attack and should not 
be admitted for repair purposes or substantively.  There is a legitimate 
concern, however, that litigants and trial judges will presume automatic 
admissibility of witness prior consistent statements after an attack with a 
prior inconsistent statement should an amendment provide that prior 
consistent statements are not hearsay when they “are offered to 
rehabilitate” after the witness is “attacked on another ground.”197 
In essence, the amended Rule as it is currently configured presents 
something of a mixed metaphor.  Its first clause arises out of the post-Tome 
era in which Rule 801(d)(1)(B) addresses appropriate rehabilitation and 
hearsay in one efficient package.198  Without any express signaling in the 
text of the amendment, the newly added clause harkens back to common 
law practice, providing a hearsay exemption but outsourcing the decision 
about proper rehabilitation to a case-by-case analysis by the trial judge.199  
There is a real risk that litigants and judges accustomed to operating in the 
post-Tome universe will construe the amended portion of the Rule 
consistently with its predecessor and fail to focus on the limited reach of 
the amendment.  Judges and lawyers using Rule 801(d)(1)(B) on a one-
stop shopping basis may ignore the contextual threshold inquiry into 
appropriate rehabilitation that must be performed in applying the second 
clause of the amended Rule.200  If they do, all prior consistent statements 
“offered to rehabilitate” a trial witness who has been impeached on any 
ground (other than recent fabrication or improper influence or motive) will 
be both admissible and available for substantive use.  Such a construction 
of the amendment could lead to the liberal and somewhat routine 
admission of witness statements feared by critics, especially if litigants 
aggressively seek admission of prior consistencies in the wake of the 
amendment. 
With sound evidentiary policy behind it, the proposed amendment 
represents an opportunity to bring needed clarity and consistency to the 
                                                                                                                          
197 May 2013 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 17, at 3. 
198 See Judge Ericksen Comment, supra note 135, at 3 (referring to the Tome language in a prior 
draft proposal as a “vestigial remnant” of the existing Rule).  
199 Indeed, the amended provision appears to track the view of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) espoused by the 
dissent in Tome.  See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 169 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f 
such a statement is admissible for a particular rehabilitative purpose . . . its proponent now may use it 
substantively, for a hearsay purpose . . . .”).  
200 To be sure, judges and litigants should appreciate that an item of evidence does not become 
admissible simply because it is “not hearsay” as provided by Rule 801(d)(1)(B).  All evidence must 
meet the minimum threshold of relevance to be admissible.  FED. R. EVID. 402.  However, the 
relevance standard sets a low bar to admissibility.  See id. 401 (classifying as “relevant” all evidence 
that has “any tendency” to make a “fact . . . of consequence . . . more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence”).   
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law of prior consistent statements.  Arriving on the scene in the post-Tome 
Rules era, however, the amendment must conform its common law roots to 
existing practice.  As currently drafted, the amendment may prove to be 
plagued by unintended misapplication.  The current proposal, although 
well-founded, threatens to squander a golden opportunity to achieve 
consistency for prior consistent statements.   
C.  How to Solve a Problem like Rule 801(d)(1)(B)  
The proposed amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) adopted by the 
Advisory Committee is premised upon a logical and workable two-step 
approach to rehabilitation and hearsay analysis that is traceable to common 
law practice.  That said, lawyers and judges accustomed to operating under 
the existing regime may have difficulty adjusting to the modified scheme.  
Relying on habitual practice under the existing Rule, litigants and judges 
may not sift the wheat from the chaff aggressively in a post-amendment 
universe.  Thus, if the language chosen for the amendment is retained, 
there may be an unintended increase in the admission of prior consistent 
statements in practice.201  There are three potential methods for preventing 
an influx of witness hearsay into the trial process through an amended Rule 
801(d)(1)(B): (1) reject any amendment and preserve the existing Rule; (2) 
repeal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) altogether and allow non-hearsay use of all prior 
consistencies only; or (3) redraft the proposed amendment to minimize the 
risk of misapplication. 
1.  Maintain the Status Quo  
The path of least resistance would be to reject any amendment to Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) and to leave practice under the Rule alone.  Many voices 
would certainly favor this approach.  Indeed, there is something to be said 
for the safety of the familiar.  Altering long-standing evidence rules is a 
risky proposition.  Courts and litigants have many years of experience with 
the current Rule and the Tome premotive analysis.  Leaving the Rule 
untouched eliminates concerns over the possibility for expanded use of 
prior witness statements.  Many of the judges surveyed by the Federal 
Judicial Center made comments to the effect that the Rule should not be 
“fixed” because it is not “broken.”202 
The obvious drawback of this option is that it ignores the fact that the 
existing Rule may be “broken” because it maintains a mysterious disparate 
treatment for different types of prior consistent statements under the 
                                                                                                                          
201  While improvident admission could form the basis for an appeal, it would be preferable to fix 
any foreseeable misinterpretation at the trial level rather than relying on the corrective of the appellate 
process. 
202 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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Evidence Rules.  In addition, this approach would maintain the need for 
complicated jury instructions of questionable utility.  Indeed, the current 
disparity in the treatment of different types of prior consistent statements 
could pose a greater fairness risk to litigants than a Rule that treats all 
admitted prior consistent statements similarly.  Under the existing Rule, an 
appellate court might find that a trial judge abused her discretion in 
allowing a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate an impeaching attack, 
thus erroneously giving the jury access to a witness’s prior consistent 
statement.  Upon a finding of error, an appellate court would review the 
record to determine the effect of the erroneous admission on the 
appellant’s trial outcome.  
For an admitted prior consistent statement covered by existing Rule 
801(d)(1)(B), an appellate court could find a harmful error requiring 
reversal given that the jury was free to make substantive use of the 
erroneously admitted prior consistency.  For admitted prior consistencies 
not covered by the current Rule, the trial judge will likely have given the 
requisite limiting instruction, cautioning the jury against reliance on the 
truth of the statement.203  Under these circumstances, it is likely that an 
appellate court would find the admission of the prior consistent statement a 
harmless error because of the protection provided by the limiting 
instruction.204  Because of the presence of limiting instructions, therefore, 
some litigants may be denied relief that would otherwise be forthcoming as 
a result of improvident admission of a prior consistency.  The Supreme 
Court has recognized the reality that jurors may be unable to adhere to 
limiting instructions in some circumstances due to the difficulty inherent in 
ignoring or disregarding what has already been revealed.205  Jurors may 
have proven incapable of disregarding the truth of the admitted prior 
consistent statement and may have relied upon it in reaching a verdict.206  
That verdict may remain unassailable due to the presence of the ignored 
instruction.  Therefore, the limiting instruction required by the current 
                                                                                                                          
203 See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 151, § 1.7, at 25 (“One common curative step is to instruct 
the jury by limiting the purposes for which evidence may be considered, directing that it be 
disregarded, or explaining it in other ways.”). 
204 See id. (“Usually reviewing courts conclude that [limiting] instructions make any error in 
admitting evidence harmless.”). 
205 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (“The fact of the matter is that too often 
such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible 
declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors.” (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 
U.S. 232, 247 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
206 See Sklansky, supra note 25, at 456 (“[J]uries should never be presumed to follow instructions 
that are incoherent or that are likely to appear senseless to them.”).  Several district court judges 
surveyed by the FJC commented that juries already use prior consistencies for their truth and disregard 
any accompanying limiting instructions.  See, e.g., FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 6 (“It is likely 
evidence admitted at trial is weighed as being admitted for its truth even if a cautionary instruction is 
given.”); id. (“[J]urors have already amended the rule.”). 
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disparity in treatment between different prior consistent statements may be 
serving to protect artificially erroneous admission of some prior consistent 
statements from appellate review.207 
It would be the unusual case in which admission of a prior statement 
that was consistent with testimony given at trial would be an outcome-
altering error.208  But Tome was just such a case.  Admission of the child 
victim’s prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) constituted 
harmful error in light of her stilted trial testimony.209  The admitted prior 
consistencies were relied upon in closing arguments and clearly were 
game-changing for the prosecution.210  Thus, the admission of those prior 
consistencies for their truth justified reversal.   
If the defense had chosen to attack the victim’s memory instead of her 
motivations, it could have suggested that she could no longer recall details 
of alleged activity that took place when she was only four years old.  In 
response to this impeaching attack, the victim’s prior consistencies that 
were made much closer to the alleged assaults may have been appropriate 
rehabilitation.  If admitted in response to an attack on memory, however, 
the victim’s prior consistent statements could not have been used for their 
truth under the current Rule and would have to be accompanied by an 
appropriate limiting instruction.  If the jury had nonetheless convicted the 
defendant, even erroneous admission of these prior consistencies would be 
unlikely to lead to reversal due to the cautionary limiting instructions given 
to the jury.  Although it might be just as probable that the jury relied upon 
the victim’s hearsay to convict, the non-hearsay purpose for the admission 
would likely insulate the conviction from reversal.  Using the Tome facts 
as an example illustrates the potential unfairness caused by differential 
treatment of similarly situated prior consistencies. 
With an amended Rule that allows all admitted prior consistencies to 
be used for their truth without any limiting instruction, appellate courts 
                                                                                                                          
207 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (noting that the proposed amendment would make “a 
finding of harmless error more difficult” because all admitted consistent statements would “become 
substantive evidence”); see also Sklansky, supra note 25, at 443 (“In some cases, though, the 
admission of certain evidence before the jury would be deemed prejudicial error in the absence of a 
curative instruction.  If we stopped presuming that evidentiary instructions worked and instead 
presumed that they did not work, those would be cases in which the judge would have to declare a 
mistrial and try the case anew.”). 
208 See GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 7012, at 154 (“[S]ince the prior consistent statement is by its 
very nature consistent with in court testimony of the witness, introduction of reversible error through 
misinterpretation is very unlikely.”); SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-32 (“[A]n error in either 
admitting or excluding a statement for its truth under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is more likely, though not 
certain, to be harmless.”). 
209 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1995) (holding that the trial judge abused 
his discretion by admitting prior consistent statements). 
210 Case Comment, Evidence––The Common-Law Premotive Rule Regains Momentum in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence––Tome v. United States, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1219, 1224 n.32 (1995). 
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would be forced to take a closer look at those admitted prior consistencies 
and police improvident admissions evenly.211  For these reasons, 
abandoning any attempt at amending the Rule and maintaining the status 
quo may not be an optimal solution.  Finally, a decision to maintain a 
conceptually irrational disconnect between similarly situated prior 
consistent statements due to fear of the unknown threatens to elevate 
“safety” over rational rule-making. 
One of the most compelling arguments for keeping the current version 
of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is that it provides a powerful “bright-line” standard 
that creates certainty for litigants and prevents trial judges from liberally 
admitting prior consistencies.212  The protection provided by the existing 
Rule is somewhat illusory, however, and fails to provide a compelling 
justification for maintaining the status quo.  First, while the existing Rule 
may constitute a bright-line standard that absolutely prohibits the 
substantive use of prior consistencies outside of its purview, administering 
the standard already demands significant judicial discretion.  Trial judges 
must ascertain whether an appropriate charge of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive has been made.213  Because such a charge 
need not be express, determining whether an implied charge has been 
levied is a necessarily contextual task requiring judicial assessment of 
impeachment techniques on a case-by-case basis.214  Furthermore, 
determining whether a prior consistent statement was made prior to the 
charged motive or influence requires a determination as to when in the 
chronology of the case the motive arose.  Although the impeaching attack 
may make this apparent in some circumstances, analysis of the timing may 
be less clear in other cases.215  Trial judges necessarily enjoy significant 
discretion in administering the existing Rule. 
Second, trial judges already possess the power to admit prior 
consistencies outside the scope of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) if they are 
appropriately rehabilitative.216  Of course, these prior consistent statements 
may be admitted only for their non-hearsay purpose.  Still, they may be 
                                                                                                                          
211 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (noting a “possibility of increased reversals”). 
212 See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that the “current language [of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)] 
places a governor on admissibility”); see also SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-37 (“The risk 
of an unbridled use of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is . . . that the Trial Court may play fast and loose with 
principles of relevance, shifting the trial from a focus on in-court to out-of-court statements.”); Bullock 
& Gardner, supra note 126, at 537 (“An argument can be made that anything but a time-line rule leaves 
some uncertainty in the parties’ pre-trial preparation.”). 
213 MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 316. 
214 See id. (“It is up to the judge to decide whether the impeachment at least implies a charge of 
contrivance.”).   
215 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 126, at 537 (“The parties cannot know exactly how the 
court will rule in regard to relevancy or the premotive or postmotive status of a prior consistent 
statement.”).  
216 MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 318.   
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published to the fact-finder and trial judges must be trusted to assess which 
prior consistent statements properly rehabilitate using flexible standards of 
relevance and probative value.217   
Finally, to suggest that trial judges need bright-line standards to cabin 
rehabilitation fairly is to reject the decision by the drafters of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to leave significant areas of impeachment and 
rehabilitation to continued case-by-case development.218  In theory, 
specific rules governing appropriate rehabilitation could make life easier 
and more predictable for trial judges and litigants.  But drafting specific 
rules of rehabilitation to cover every possible scenario that might arise at 
trial would be an exercise in futility.  Like general notions of relevance, 
many issues regarding proper impeachment and rehabilitation are best left 
to flexible contextual decision-making.219  For all of these reasons, 
preserving existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a bright line limitation to prevent 
discretionary judicial consideration of the appropriate use of prior 
consistencies appears ill-advised. 
2.   Back to the Future: Consistency Through Repeal of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B). 
There is, of course, another way of achieving consistency between 
prior consistent statements without risking liberal admission of prior 
witness consistencies.  Although likely to be a political non-starter, the 
Advisory Committee could achieve logical consistency by eliminating the 
hearsay exemption provided by Rule 801(d)(1)(B) altogether, relegating all 
prior consistent statements solely to rehabilitative use.220  Indeed, if the 
fundamental significance of such witness consistencies stems from their 
rehabilitative value, it makes sense to confine the use of all such statements 
to that fundamental purpose.  With a repeal of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the trial 
judge would be charged with determining the rehabilitative value of a 
proffered prior consistent statement and could allow its admission for non-
hearsay credibility purposes alone.  Limited admissibility would require an 
instruction cautioning the fact-finder against substantive use of the prior 
consistent statement in all cases.  This would restore logic to the Rules and 
                                                                                                                          
217 See id. (“[T]he judge has discretion under Rules 401 and 403 to determine whether the 
particular circumstances justify admission of consistent statements to rehabilitate the witness.”). 
218 See supra notes 45–46, 51 and accompanying text. 
219 See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 151, at 161 n.7 (explaining that the “‘variety of relevancy 
problems is coextensive with the ingenuity of counsel in using circumstantial evidence as a means of 
proof’ and that an ‘enormous number of cases fall in no set pattern,’ and therefore Rule 401 is intended 
only ‘as a guide for handling them’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note)).   
220 Illinois has maintained this common law approach even after the enactment of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) in the federal system.  See People v. Lambert, 681 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) 
(“Illinois follows the common-law rule that, where admission is allowed, a prior consistent statement is 
permitted solely for rehabilitative purposes and not as substantive evidence.”).   
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case law by treating similarly situated prior consistent statements 
consistently—none would be available for their truth.221   
Such a solution runs counter to the policy espoused by the current 
Rule, which explains that there is “no sound reason” to restrict substantive 
use of such admitted consistent statements, however.222  To support 
elimination of the hearsay exemption that has existed since 1975, there 
must indeed be some good reason for such a change in course and 
limitation on the use of prior consistent statements.  Whether or not there is 
such a reason may depend on one’s view of the efficacy of limiting 
instructions.  To the extent that jurors can be relied upon to comprehend 
and adhere to such instructions, eliminating substantive availability of prior 
consistent statements may make sense.223  Proponents of a witness will 
have access to all such consistencies to the extent that they have 
rehabilitative value, but will always be forced to build a case from the 
witness’s live testimony. 
But skeptics have long questioned jurors’ ability to ignore information 
they have already received.224  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged the failings of limiting instructions in certain contexts.225  
Several of the district court judges surveyed regarding the proposed 
amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) commented that jurors ignore such 
instructions and rely on prior consistencies substantively, notwithstanding 
warnings to the contrary.226  If jurors ignore instructions limiting the use of 
prior consistent statements to their rehabilitative purposes—willfully, 
unconsciously, or from a lack of comprehension—they may utilize those 
prior consistent statements substantively for their truth.  If this happens, the 
prejudiced party is unlikely to have any recourse due to the appellate 
                                                                                                                          
221 Of course, if a prior consistent statement by a trial witness satisfied a separate exception to the 
hearsay rule, it could be substantively admissible through that exception without regard to its 
rehabilitative value.  FED. R. EVID. 802.   
222 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note. 
223 Of course, the American trial system depends upon the premise that juries comprehend and 
follow instructions provided to them.  See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (“Unless 
we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court’s instructions where those instructions are 
clear and the circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury 
system makes little sense.” (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
224 See Sklansky, supra note 25, at 410–13 (describing the legal community’s long-standing belief 
that lay jurors are incapable of following limiting and other evidentiary instructions). 
225 See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129 (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome 
by instructions to the jury all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” (quoting Krulewitch 
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (observing that the admission of evidence 
for a limited purpose can be problematic for a jury and commenting that “[d]iscrimination so subtle is a 
feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds”).  
226  FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 3. 
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practice of finding limiting instructions curative.227  Therefore, the 
existence of limiting instructions could insulate improvident use of prior 
consistent statements from review under a version of the Rules that rejects 
substantive use of prior consistent statements altogether. 
Although treating all prior consistencies similarly on its face, such a 
rule could create more disparity and unpredictability in the treatment of 
prior consistent statements below the surface.  Parties would continue to 
depend upon the trial judge’s assessment of the rehabilitative value of prior 
consistent statements to determine which will be admitted, but will have no 
way of knowing when the fact-finder will disregard the limiting instruction 
and when it will adhere to it.  Under this scenario, some prior consistent 
statements will in fact be used for their truth and others will not, but 
litigants will have no method for discerning the difference because it will 
be hidden through the use of limiting instructions.   
If there is legitimate reason to fear a jury’s disregard of a limiting 
instruction, bringing logical consistency to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) by 
expanding it to all rehabilitative prior consistent statements may be the 
better course.228  In that case, all prior consistent statements admitted to 
rehabilitate legitimately will be available substantively to the fact-finder.  
If such substantive use of a prior consistent statement is improper in a 
particular case under standards of appropriate rehabilitation, the aggrieved 
party can obtain appellate review of the admission decision based upon the 
reality that the statement was considered substantively, rather than have 
that appeal foreclosed by the fiction that the fact-finder dutifully complied 
with a limiting instruction.  
3.   Preserving the Amendment and the Original Intent of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) 
Each of the preceding avenues for eliminating concerns about the 
proposed amendment throws the baby out with the bath water.  Quashing 
the amendment and retaining existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would maintain 
an irrational status quo in the name of safety and out of fear of change.  
The repeal of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) altogether would remove potentially 
helpful evidence from the fact-finder, increase the use of confusing 
limiting instructions at trial, and create unreviewable disparities in jury use 
of prior consistencies. 
The third possible approach to the mixed message of the current 
proposal is to revise the amendment in an effort to define clearly in rule 
text the analysis necessary for admission of prior consistent statements for 
substantive purposes.  Such a revision could provide judges and litigants 
                                                                                                                          
227 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
228 See Sklansky, supra note 25, at 447 (noting that reconsideration of an evidence rule is 
appropriate when judges cannot craft a limiting instruction that is likely to be understood by a lay jury). 
 2014] SEEKING CONSISTENCY FOR PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 983 
meaningful tools to prevent indiscriminate admission of all witness 
consistencies.  Although there are undoubtedly numerous possible 
revisions that could be undertaken, two seem most suited to achieving 
greater consistency for prior consistent statements, while simultaneously 
minimizing (if not eliminating entirely) concerns about expansive use of 
witness statements.229  The first potential revision would preserve the two-
category approach of the current proposal, as well as the language of 
original Rule 801(d)(1)(B).  The second possible revision would be more 
drastic, discarding the language of the original Rule in favor of a single 
hearsay exemption applicable to all prior consistencies properly admitted 
to rehabilitate any type of impeaching attack. 
a.  A Modest Revision  
The first possible revision presents a modest change that would not 
disturb practice under existing Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and would highlight the 
proper analysis of the newly added provision for judges and lawyers.  
Instead of suggesting that a prior consistency may come in whenever it is 
“offered” to rehabilitate an impeached witness, an amendment could be 
drafted to capture a threshold conclusion about limited rehabilitative use, 
as follows: 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that 
meets the following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant 
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement: . . . 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is 
independently admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of: 
(i) rebutting an express or implied charge that the declarant 
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying; or  
(ii) repairing another specific impeaching attack on the 
declarant’s credibility as a witness; . . . .230 
This draft offers several benefits.  First, spelling out the threshold 
inquiry into limited rehabilitative value in rule text may curb overly 
aggressive resort to prior consistencies.  Furthermore, highlighting the 
rehabilitation question in rule text may arm opponents of a prior 
consistency with the appropriate objection under the amendment.  With 
                                                                                                                          
229 Indeed, some of the district judges surveyed about a proposed amendment offered redrafting 
suggestions.  See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 7 (“Maybe you could delete the language above, 
‘whenever it would be otherwise admissible to’ and instead just say, ‘if it rehabilitates a witness.’”). 
230 The emphases stress suggested language that differs from the proposed amendment. 
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such a draft, opponents of prior consistencies would insist upon clear 
articulation of the rehabilitative value of the proffered consistency.  Judges 
and lawyers would be certain to appreciate the unique operation of the 
amended hearsay exemption, requiring a finding about limited non-hearsay 
use before allowing substantive use of a prior consistency.  Importantly, a 
draft that emphasizes consideration of rehabilitation independently of 
hearsay re-aligns the Rule with its common law antecedents and eliminates 
the potential use of the Rule as a proxy for admission of prior 
consistencies.  Judges and litigants will not be lulled into thinking that any 
prior consistent statement “offered” to rehabilitate becomes automatically 
admissible for its truth, but instead will focus on the “specific impeaching 
attack” and on the non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose for the proffered 
prior consistency. 
The last paragraph of the proposed Advisory Committee Note to the 
current amendment clarifies that the Rule “does not make any consistent 
statement admissible that was not admissible previously.”231  Still, it seems 
important to make this point more overtly in Rule text.  Although the 
Advisory Committee Notes are widely recognized as authoritative for 
proper rule interpretation,232 it is possible that judges and litigators could 
miss the finer points buried in the notes in the heat of trial.  Further, the 
unusual focus on non-hearsay value under an amendment may demand 
more overt explanation to avoid misapplication.   
Finally, this draft would preserve Tome and existing practice by 
maintaining its triggering language and via express language to that effect 
in the proposed Advisory Committee Note.233  Thus, this version of an 
amended Rule would not alter the way in which judges and lawyers 
currently handle prior consistencies used to repair charges of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive.  The preservation of Tome in 
such a revision is also its biggest weakness.  By maintaining Tome and the 
premotive limitation, this draft would include provisions within the same 
Rule embodying contradictory philosophies.  The first clause of such a 
draft would continue to occupy the field of rehabilitation and hearsay, 
while the second clause would require a distinctly independent assessment 
of the rehabilitative value of a particular proffered prior consistent 
statement.  Furthermore, like the proposed amendment, this version of the 
Rule would fail to achieve true consistency for prior consistent statements 
and would maintain the need for confusing limiting instructions in some 
circumstances.  In Tome, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
                                                                                                                          
231 Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833.   
232 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (“We have relied on those well-
considered [Advisory Committee] Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules.”).   
233 The current proposed advisory committee note expressly maintains the Tome premotive 
requirement.  Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 832.  
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postmotive statements could serve to rehabilitate charges of improper 
motive or influence in some, albeit rare, circumstances.234  Under a version 
of the amendment that retains Tome, therefore, some postmotive 
statements could be admitted for their limited non-hearsay purpose even if 
they are not admissible for their truth under the first clause of an amended 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), thus requiring limiting instructions for the jury in some 
cases.  Any draft that maintains Tome and its rigid rejection of postmotive 
statements will fail to achieve genuine uniformity in the approach to prior 
consistent statements.  Maintaining Tome also could generate additional 
interpretive problems requiring resolution by the courts.  Although 
generally recognized methods of impeachment do exist, actual impeaching 
attacks in the courtroom often defy concrete categorization.235  Litigants 
may dispute which of the two clauses in the amended Rule they are relying 
upon in proffering a prior consistent statement.  The overlapping nature of 
impeaching attacks may make it difficult for the trial judge to regulate a 
continuing premotive requirement in a post-amendment universe.   
b.  A Single Standard 
For these reasons, an amendment that creates a single standard 
applicable to all prior consistent statements promises to achieve the 
greatest uniformity in the treatment of prior consistencies and is most 
closely aligned with the policies outlined in the original Advisory 
Committee Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).  Such an amendment would treat all 
proffered prior consistencies similarly and would avoid the slippery task of 
classifying or categorizing different breeds of impeachment and 
rehabilitation.236  Importantly, the key feature of a single-standard 
amendment would be a case-by-case inquiry into the threshold question of 
rehabilitation as a condition precedent to use of prior consistencies for their 
truth as a matter of hearsay doctrine.237  
An amended Rule simply could provide for the substantive 
admissibility of all prior consistent statements that have been evaluated as 
properly admissible for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the declarant’s 
                                                                                                                          
234 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158 (explaining that postmotive out-of-court consistent statements can 
rebut a charge of fabrication or improper motive or influence in a less forceful way); see also Bullock 
& Gardner, supra note 126, at 535–36 (detailing circumstances in which postmotive statements could 
rehabilitate an impeached trial witness).   
235 See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 47, at 316 (noting that an attack with a prior inconsistent 
statement could be “interpretable as a charge of a recent plan or contrivance to give false testimony”). 
236 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-33 (noting that a single standard hearsay 
exemption applicable to all prior consistencies admitted to rehabilitate would “make the Rule more 
straightforward and simpler to apply in practice”).   
237 A single standard option was the original proposal circulated to district court judges in 
connection with the survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center.  See FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, 
at 2 (displaying a single-standard proposal allowing consistent witness statements “otherwise 
admissible to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness”). 
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credibility as a witness, as follows: 
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that 
meets the following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant 
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement: . . .  
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is 
independently admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of 
repairing a specific impeaching attack on the declarant’s 
credibility as a witness; . . . .238 
Such a rule would clarify that all prior consistent statements properly 
admissible for limited rehabilitative purposes may be used substantively as 
well.  By making an express reference to the non-hearsay purpose for a 
prior consistency, this draft prevents litigants from skipping straight to 
substantive use of the statement as they may do under other hearsay 
exceptions and exemptions.  Language in the text of the rule focusing 
judges and litigants on the fact that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows substantive 
use of prior consistent statements only to the extent that they will already 
be available to the fact-finder for their non-hearsay rehabilitation purpose 
captures the intended operation of the amendment and may prevent the 
expansive use feared by critics. 
Importantly, this simple unitary standard for all proffered prior 
consistencies would reflect a single philosophical approach to the 
substantive use of witness consistencies.  Regardless of the type of 
impeachment launched, the hearsay rule would never control proper 
rehabilitation: a trial judge would need to undertake an independent 
assessment of proper rehabilitation in every case before affording 
substantive use to a witness consistency.  Indeed, this draft would focus 
judges and lawyers on the common law rehabilitation analysis that 
routinely was required prior to the adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(B).  In 
contrast to the current proposal and consistent with the common law 
practice upon which Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is premised, this rule would leave 
to the trial judge entirely the question of which prior consistent statements 
rehabilitate.  Eliminating standards of proper rehabilitation from the 
hearsay exemption altogether also aligns with the choice to avoid the 
almost impossible task of regulating rehabilitation practices under the 
Rules.239 
An amendment with a single standard focused on admissibility for 
rehabilitative purposes tracks the policies articulated in the Advisory 
                                                                                                                          
238 The emphasis stresses language that differs from the proposed amendment. 
239 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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Committee Note to original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) precisely.  Those notes 
provide that if a prior consistency is going to be admitted anyway because 
the opponent opened the door to it with a particular impeaching technique, 
the jury might as well be permitted to rely on the statement substantively 
because it merely echoes previously received trial testimony.240  The key to 
those notes, the independent admissibility of the prior consistency for 
rehabilitation, is also the key to the operation of such a draft rule. 
Unlike the proposed amendment adopted by the Advisory Committee 
and the modest revision suggested above, this version of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
would truly “extend[] the argument made in the original Advisory 
Committee Note to its logical conclusion” and achieve genuine consistency 
for all prior consistent statements at trial.241  If a trial judge finds that a 
witness’s prior consistency rehabilitates a specific impeaching attack, 
regardless of the type of attack, the prior consistent statement will be 
admissible to repair, as well as for its truth in all cases.  Conversely, if a 
trial judge finds that a prior consistency fails to repair a specific 
impeaching attack on the declarant witness, it will be excluded entirely and 
unavailable to the fact-finder for any purpose.242  Under a revision like this 
one, prior consistencies offered to rehabilitate either will be admitted with 
full use or excluded entirely.  There would be no class of inferior prior 
consistencies—available to repair if accompanied by a limiting instruction, 
but not for their truth.243  Furthermore, all admitted prior consistencies 
would be treated similarly on appeal because none would be accompanied 
by the confusing limiting instruction that may or may not prevent the fact-
finder’s reliance on the admitted statement.   
This single-standard proposal resembles the draft Rule originally 
circulated to federal district judges in the Federal Judicial Center survey.  
In that draft of the amendment, the Advisory Committee proposed a 
provision allowing substantive use of all prior consistent statements 
“otherwise admissible to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a 
witness.”244  This originally proposed language also emphasized the 
condition precedent to substantive use of a prior consistent statement—an 
assessment of the statement’s rehabilitative qualities.  However, some 
federal district judges expressed confusion about the meaning of the 
                                                                                                                          
240 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (“The prior statement is consistent 
with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its 
admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.”). 
241 PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 128, at 218. 
242 It may, of course, be admissible through any other hearsay exceptions applicable to the 
statement.  See FED. R. EVID. 802 (stating that hearsay is inadmissible unless specifically provided for 
by the rules).  
243 See supra notes 67 and accompanying text.  
244 FJC SURVEY, supra note 18, at 2. 
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language “otherwise admissible.”245  In order to focus judges and litigants 
on the threshold rehabilitation inquiry necessary under the Rule, an 
amendment that more explicitly mandates an “independent” finding of 
“non-hearsay” rehabilitative value in the wake of an identified impeaching 
attack may eliminate any potential confusion. 
Therefore, a positive effect of a single-standard amendment would be 
to bring logic, simplicity, and uniformity to the evaluation of prior 
consistent statements.  It would best capture the original purpose of the 
Rule by emphasizing the trial judge’s independent rehabilitation 
assessment as driving operation of the hearsay provision.  On the negative 
side, however, such an amendment would effectively overrule the hard and 
fast Tome premotive standard and alter longstanding practice, to the extent 
that trial judges could find some postmotive statements rehabilitative—at 
least in rare cases.246  Of course, a major obstacle to an amendment like 
this one would be the certain backlash against any attempt to dismantle the 
well-established and rigid Tome premotive requirement.   
To protect against such a backlash, the Advisory Committee Note to 
such an amendment could reinforce Tome’s essential premise that 
postmotive prior consistent statements rarely serve a rehabilitative purpose 
that would justify admissibility.247  That truism notwithstanding, the 
Advisory Committee Note could clarify the intent of the amendment to 
leave proper rehabilitation to the independent discretion of the trial judge.  
Thus, the Rule need not reject Tome’s emphasis on the importance of 
timing in most circumstances, but may nonetheless clarify that the hearsay 
rules are not designed to regulate proper rehabilitation. 
While any amendment that eliminates Tome’s rigid approach to the 
premotive limitation is certain to be controversial, rule-makers should 
consider thoughtfully the merits and demerits of the rigid Tome rule in a 
post-amendment universe.  As described above, maintaining the rigid 
requirement would defeat genuine consistency in the treatment of admitted 
prior consistent statements and could generate interpretive disputes at trial.  
In addition, the value of Tome may be diminished by an amendment to 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B).  Indeed, the Supreme Court found the premotive 
requirement embedded in the Rule to explain the substantive availability of 
only one type of prior consistent statement under existing Rule 
801(d)(1)(B).248  As specifically explained by the Court: “If consistent 
                                                                                                                          
245 See id. at 19 (“What does ‘otherwise admissible’ to rehabilitate mean?”). 
246 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 120, at 43 (noting that a proposed amendment like this one “would 
now make [prior consistencies] substantive evidence, thus doing an end-run around the holding of 
Tome”). 
247 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 126, at 537 (“It is important to note that in most cases, 
postmotive prior consistent statements will be inadmissible under the relevancy rules for the reasons 
originally noted by courts developing common-law evidentiary rules.”). 
248 Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 159 (1995). 
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statements are admissible without reference to the timeframe we find 
imbedded in the Rule, there appears no sound reason not to admit 
consistent statements to rebut other forms of impeachment as well.”249 
The Advisory Committee is currently considering expanding 
substantive use of prior consistent statements to cover these other methods 
of impeachment and rehabilitation.  Should the Rule be expanded to 
include all types of prior consistencies, the premotive requirement would 
no longer be necessary to distinguish prior consistent statements that are 
substantively available from those that are not.250 
Indeed, the premotive requirement may not only be less necessary 
under an amended Rule, but also inadequate to curb the improper use of 
prior consistent statements feared by critics of the amendment.  In Tome, 
all of the young victim’s out-of-court statements accusing her father of 
abuse were made after her parents’ divorce required her to spend time 
alone in her father’s care.251  Where the defense’s cross-examination 
implied that the victim’s story of abuse was designed to influence the 
custody arrangement to allow her to stay with her mother, the victim’s 
prior statements were all made after this alleged motive to fabricate 
arose.252  On these facts, the Supreme Court used the premotive 
requirement to exclude these powerful and damning hearsay statements by 
the victim.  
Close consideration of Tome suggests that while the premotive 
requirement may have served its purpose on the facts of Tome, it may be 
inadequate to protect against improvident use of hearsay in other cases.  
Suppose the victim in Tome had made all of her powerful and damning 
accusations of abuse before her parents’ divorce, perhaps precipitating it.  
Under the analysis in Tome, the prosecutor would be permitted to use the 
victim’s premotive consistent statements for their truth in response to 
defense counsel’s questioning about the victim’s desire to return to her 
                                                                                                                          
249 Id.; see also SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 35, at 801-36 (“If the drafters of the Federal Rules 
did not intend to impose a pre-motive requirement, then there would have been no need to carve out 
those statements offered to rebut a charge of fabrication, motive, or influence for special substantive 
treatment.”).   
250 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 159 (“Whatever objections can be leveled against limiting the Rule to 
this designated form of impeachment and confining the rebuttal to those statements made before the 
fabrication or improper influence or motive arose, it is clear to us that the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
were relying upon the common-law temporal requirement.”); id. at 160 (“The language of the Rule, in 
its concentration on rebutting charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive to the 
exclusion of other forms of impeachment, as well as in its use of wording that follows the language of 
the common-law cases, suggests that it was intended to carry over the common-law premotive rule.” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 168 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[O]nly 
the premotive-statement limitation makes it rational to admit a prior corroborating statement to rebut a 
charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, but not to rebut a charge that the witness’ memory is 
playing tricks.”). 
251 Id. at 153 (majority opinion). 
252 Id. at 155. 
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mother’s custody.  While satisfying the premotive requirement, such use of 
victim hearsay appears inconsistent with the purposes of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B). 
Although the defense may have opened a door with its challenge to the 
little girl’s motivations, the prior statements were anything but a mere 
repetition of her trial testimony.  Her stilted responses to leading questions 
failed to paint a persuasive picture of abuse on the stand.253  To have 
allowed her detailed out-of-court accusations would implicate the core 
hearsay risk of substituting hearsay for trial testimony.  Furthermore, 
allowing such statements appears at odds with the policy underlying Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) that takes a “why not?” approach to substantive use of prior 
consistent statements because it assumes that the statements add nothing to 
trial testimony, but merely echo it in a way that repairs an opponent’s 
impeaching attack.  The probative value of such premotive statements to 
rehabilitate would be substantially outweighed by their tendency to add to 
the prosecution’s case against Tome.  Therefore, a premotive requirement 
may not effectively prevent admission of hearsay like that at issue in Tome.  
Rather, a cautious and thoughtful Rule 403 evaluation of prior witness 
statements to weigh their rehabilitative value against their hearsay risk 
holds far greater promise for protecting against misuse of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B).  The proposed Advisory Committee Note emphasizing the 
importance of a Rule 403 analysis may be far more important in promoting 
the intended use of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) than a strict premotive limitation.254   
Even assuming that a rigid premotive requirement appears unnecessary 
and inadequate, some may balk at any amendment that overturns a 
standard set by the Supreme Court almost twenty years ago.255  While this 
concern merits careful consideration, it is important to emphasize the basis 
for the Tome holding.  The majority in Tome discovered a premotive 
requirement in the Rule after examining the Advisory Committee Note to 
the original Rule and as a result of efforts to divine the intent of the 
drafters.256  The premotive requirement resulted from the Court’s 
                                                                                                                          
253 See id. at 153 (“For the most part, [the victim’s] direct testimony consisted of one- and two-
word answers to a series of leading questions.”). 
254 See Committee Note to Proposed Rule, supra note 118, at 833 (“[T]o be admissible for 
rehabilitation, a prior consistent statement must satisfy the strictures of Rule 403.”).  
255 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Philip Reed Professor of Law, Fordham Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Reporter, to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 19 (April 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2013-05.pdf 
(“If the Committee is of the view that the Tome pre-motive requirement should be rejected, then the 
proposed amendment would need to be reconsidered on the merits and the Committee should resurrect 
the initial draft of the proposed amendment . . . .”).   
256 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 160 (“We have relied on [the Advisory Committee’s] well-considered 
Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules. . . ‘[T]he Committee’s commentary is 
particularly relevant in determining the meaning of the document Congress enacted.’” (quoting Beech 
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1988))).     
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interpretation of the intent of the Rule’s drafters and was not based on 
constitutional principles binding on rule-makers.  To the extent that the 
intent of the rule-makers has evolved with experience in implementation of 
the Rule, an amendment that reflects that altered intent may indeed be 
appropriate.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Since its enactment, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) has created disparity in the 
treatment of similarly situated prior consistent statements by trial 
witnesses.  A rule that sets up irrational and confusing distinctions between 
evidence properly admitted at trial for identical rehabilitative purposes is 
deleterious to the administration of justice generally and may even 
generate unfair outcomes in some cases.  The policies articulated in 
support of original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) extend logically to cover other prior 
consistencies admitted to repair witness credibility.  Therefore, an 
amendment to the Rule that would create uniformity in the treatment of 
admitted prior consistent statements is in order.   
Because of the detailed language describing rehabilitation practice in 
the original Rule, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that language 
in Tome, today’s trial lawyers and judges may be accustomed to using 
current Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a proxy for appropriate rehabilitative and 
substantive use of prior consistencies.  In contrast, the newly added 
provision in the current proposed draft amendment fails to spell out the 
particulars of proper rehabilitation and leaves that question for case-by-
case consideration by trial judges.  If the open-ended language of the 
current proposal is retained, litigants may seek to use it similarly as a 
general blessing for admission of prior consistent witness statements 
following any impeaching attack not covered by the existing Rule.  Such 
use is not in line with the drafters’ intent for the amended Rule or with the 
traditional common-law approach to rehabilitation with prior consistencies.  
A liberal interpretation of the amended Rule arising out of current practice 
under the Rule could indeed increase the improper use of pre-trial witness 
statements as evidence. 
The optimal solution would be a revision to the proposed amendment 
applying a single standard to substantive availability of all prior 
consistencies, regardless of the impeaching technique employed.  Such a rule 
should highlight expressly the threshold inquiry into proper non-hearsay use 
for rehabilitative purposes as a condition precedent to substantive 
availability.  To echo the Advisory Committee Note to the original Rule, it is 
only when the jury will have access to the prior consistency for repair 
purposes that the hearsay exemption makes good common sense.  While any 
amendment that eliminates the long-standing strict Tome rule promises to be 
controversial, this option is best suited to achieve true symmetry and 
consistency for prior consistent statements in the trial process. 
